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INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2007, South Korea (“Korea”) enacted the Act on the 
Punishment of Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (“the Act”).1  Article 1 of the Act declares that the purposes of this 
legislation are to punish crimes under the Rome Statute (“ICC Statute” or 
“ICCSt.”) of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)2 in the territory of 
Korea and to set the procedure for cooperation between the ICC and Korea.  
The Act is considered an important development in Korean criminal law 
primarily in the following two respects: i) core international crimes (i.e. 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) have now been 
incorporated into the Korean legal order through its own legislation; and ii) 
the theory of universal jurisdiction has been introduced and clearly codified 
in Korean domestic law. Given the monist approach taken by the Korean 
Constitution in terms of the process of incorporating international law into 
Korean domestic law, one might say that the Act is not necessary. Yet, 
taking into account the requirement of the principle of legality in the area of 
criminal law, the decision to legislate the Act should be welcomed and 
might be a reference point for other countries adopting the monist approach.  
 1. Gookjehyongsa jaepanso gwanhal beomje eu chobol dunge gwanhan beobryul 
[Act on the Punishment of Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court], Act. No. 8719, Dec. 21, 2007 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Act]. It must be noted that since 
there is no official translation of the Act from Korean into English, the relevant provisions of 
the Act in English herein are the authors’ own translations. 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
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At first glance the Act—which includes only twenty articles—looks 
quite simple and succinct. In particular, the decision to apply mutatis 
mutandis existing domestic law for the purpose of cooperation and legal 
assistance between Korea and the ICC renders the relevant section in the 
Act overly simple. With regard to the substantive law, the peculiar wording 
of “with the aim of destroying” (as opposed to the usual expression, “with 
intent to destroy”) employed in the Act for ‘genocidal intent’ drew the 
authors’ attention. We also recognized complicated—if not confusing—
codification of the relevant provisions concerning the command and 
superior responsibility. The authors will discuss all of these features below 
in detail. The reader might take note at the outset that the authors spent quite 
a large portion of this article on the examination of the unique wording 
employed by the Act concerning genocidal intent and its legal ramification, 
specifically in view of the recent scholarly discussions taking place on the 
issue. 
In Part I, the authors will explore the important substantive law issues 
spotted in the Act. In addition to the section on genocidal intent, the 
provisions relating to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and command 
and superior responsibility will be examined. As for command and superior 
responsibility, the authors will recommend significant revision of the 
relevant provisions. On the other hand, though the Act does not contain any 
provisions pertaining to modes of liability, the authors will discuss the 
modes of liability under the Korean Penal Code that will be applied mutatis 
mutandis to the crimes prescribed in the Act; we will pay special attention 
to the liability of co–perpetration and the functional control theory thereof 
as adopted by the Korean Constitutional Court. Part II of this article 
addresses the process of incorporation and execution of international treaties 
in Korea. On the basis of general description of the relevant procedure, the 
specific features of the ICC Statute that allowed the Act to be submitted as a 
lex specialis to the Korean Penal Code will be dealt with. In Part III, the 
jurisdictional bases provided in the Act will be discussed, with particular 
focus on the theory of universal jurisdiction newly introduced into the 
Korean legal order via the Act. Part IV will demonstrate the mutatis 
mutandis application regime chosen by the drafters of the Act for the 
purpose of cooperation and legal assistance between Korea and the ICC.  
Furthermore, the pros and the cons of this arrangement will be discussed. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Before the Act was entered into force on December 21, 2007, the core 
international crimes under the ICC Statute had not existed within the scope 
of domestic criminal law of South Korea (with the exception of war crimes 
provided in the relevant treaties ratified by South Korea; examples of these 
treaties include the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional 
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Protocols of 1977 etc). Key features of substantive law as provided in the 
Act are as follows: 
Article 5: Responsibility of commanders or other superiors; 
Article 8: Genocide; 
Article 9: Crimes against humanity; 
 Article 10: War crimes against persons; 
Article 11: War crimes against property and other rights; 
Article 12: War crimes against humanitarian operations and emblems; 
Article 13: War crimes concerning prohibited methods of warfare; 
Article 14: War crimes concerning prohibited weapons of warfare; 
Article 15: Offence of negligence violating the duty of commanders and 
other superiors; 
Article 16: Offences against the administration of justice. 
Regarding genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the Act 
not only provides definitions of the crimes but also applicable penalties for 
each offence or each group of offences. Generally speaking, when a victim 
has “died as a result of an act referred to in the relevant provision,” the 
person is to be sentenced to capital punishment—life–imprisonment or 
imprisonment of not less than seven years.3  It reflects the theory of 
consequence–based aggravation of penalties adopted by the Korean Penal 
Code. For this purpose, it should be noted that Article 15(2) of the code 
requires foreseeability in relation to the serious result, like consequence of 
death. With respect for attempts—as provided in Article 25(3)(f) of the ICC 
Statute—we can find the equivalent provisions in Article 8 through Article 
14 respectively. 
A. Genocide: “With the Aim of Destroying” Instead of “With Intent 
to Destroy”
Article 8 of the Act—which provides for the crime of genocide—is
consistent with the corresponding provision (Article 6) of the ICC Statute 
and generally verbatim in language. There is, however, unique wording 
 3. Act, supra note 1, arts. 8(1), 8(3), 9(1), 9(4), 10(1), 10(6), 12(2), 13(2). 
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employed by the Act concerning genocidal intent. This feature and its 
potential implications will be explored in detail below. 
1. The Concept of Aim–Crimes under the Korean Penal Code 
It is noteworthy that the Act uses a different wording than the ICC 
Statute regarding special intent (dolus specialis), specific intent, or 
genocidal intent of genocide. That is, instead of using the phrase “with 
intent to destroy” (Article 6 ICCSt.), Article 8(1) of the Act employs the 
wording “with the aim of destroying.” Is there any significant difference 
between these two wordings? The validity and value of the new wording 
“with the aim of destroying” deserve our closer scrutiny. 
The phrase “with the aim of” is not new in the context of Korean 
criminal law. There are a number of offences under the Korean Penal Code 
(“Code”) where the phrase “with the aim of” is provided—such as the crime 
of causing internal disturbance (Article 87 of the Code),4 the crime of 
organizing a criminal group (Article 114 of the Code), and the crime of 
forging currency (Article 207 of the Code). The common legal feature of 
these offences is that they constitute the respective crime only if a relevant 
conduct is committed with a certain aim, in other words “with the aim of
violating the national territory or disturb[ing] the constitutional order”
(crime of causing internal disturbance), “with the aim of criminal activities”
(crime of organizing a criminal group) and “with the aim of using [the 
forged currency]” (crime of forging currency). 
As the definition of the crime specifically requires a showing of the 
existence of an “aim,” the offences under the Korean Penal Code stipulated 
with the phrase “with the aim of” have been generally referred to as an aim–
crime. The so–called aim–crime also includes a few offences for which the 
phrase “with the aim of” is not explicitly provided in the relevant provisions 
of the Korean Penal Code. A typical example is larceny (Article 329 of the 
Code) which requires an “intent to exclude the owner, and to use or dispose 
of another person’s property in accordance with its economical usage.”5
Korean scholars are generally of the view that the essential characteristics of 
the aim–crime are: i) “aim” is a mental element; ii) “aim” is distinguished 
from the general mental element of “intent” in that it does not correspond to 
any material element(s) of the crime; iii) the object of “aim” (e.g., use of 
forged currency) exists beyond the material elements of the crime; and thus 
iv) the realization of the object of “aim” (e.g., actually using forged 
currency) is not required to be proven.6 In this respect, the aim–crime under 
 4. Hyongbeob [Korean Penal Code], Act No. 293, art. 87 (Sept. 18, 1953) (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Korean Penal Code]. 
 5. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 91Do3149, Sept. 8, 1992 (S. Kor.).  
 6. IL–SU KIM & BO–HACK SUH, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 234–35
(2006); WOONG YIM, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 106 (2005).
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the Korean Penal Code seems to fall into the category of the common law 
concept of specific intent offences. In explaining the specific intent 
offences, Joshua Dressler takes the examples of larceny (taking away the 
personal property of another “with the intent to permanently deprive the 
other person of his property”) and burglary (entering the dwelling of another 
in the night–time “with intent to commit a felony”).7  Here, both the “intent 
to permanently deprive the other person of his property” and the “intent to 
commit a felony” can be viewed as something equivalent to the mental 
element of “aim” under Korean criminal law.8
It is important to note that the mental element of “aim” under Korean 
criminal law does not correspond to any material elements of “conduct,”
“consequence,” or “circumstance” and/or whatever material elements the 
relevant criminal provision contains.9 Furthermore, the mental element of 
“aim” seems to fulfill its function without requiring a corresponding 
material element at all. In other words, the object of “aim” (e.g., using 
forged currency) should not be regarded as a material element, and 
especially not as a “consequence” or “result.” Accordingly, the “violation of 
the national territory” (Article 87), “disturbing the constitutional order”
(Article 87), “performing criminal activities” (Article 114), or “using forged 
currency” (Article 207) should not be considered as a separate material 
element, but instead as an ingredient of the mental element of “aim.”
Whether the ingredient of “aim” becomes materialized is legally irrelevant 
and has nothing to do with the constitution of the crime. Severance between 
the mental element of “aim” and the physical realization thereof seems to be 
the key in understanding the legal nature of the aim–crime under the Korean 
Penal Code. In sum, it is considered that i) the mental element of “aim”
required to be proven by the definition of the aim–crime is only directed at
 7. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 137–38 (5th ed. 2009).  
 8. In this respect, the genocide provision in the United States Code that employs the 
wording of “with the specific intent to destroy” seems to signify the same understanding of 
the nature of genocidal intent as that of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006). On the other 
hand, it should be noted that the conceptual scope of the “specific intent” offence in the 
common law is broader than that of the aim–crime under the Korean law. That is because the 
former includes another sub–category of the offences where the definition of the crime 
“provides that the actor must be aware of a statutory attendant circumstance” (e.g., 
“receiving stolen property with knowledge that it is stolen”). In this definition, the mens rea
(knowledge) is required to correspond to actus reus (circumstance), which is not the case 
with aim–crimes under Korean criminal law. See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 137–38. 
 9. In this respect, the mental element of “aim” in the Korean criminal law context 
seems to be equivalent to Paul Robinson’s concept of “future–conduct intention” in that “[a] 
requirement of a future conduct intention . . . by definition has no corresponding objective 
element but rather exists on its own . . .” See Paul Robinson, A Functional Analysis of 
Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 864 (1994). In another text, Robinson clarifies that the 
concept of “future–conduct intention” is equivalent to “specific intent” in the common law. 
See Paul Robinson, Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus–Mens Rea 
Distinction?, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 187, 205 n. 63 (Stephen Shute, John 
Gardner, & Jeremy Horder eds., 2003). 
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“some future act or . . . some further consequence . . . beyond the conduct or 
result that constitutes the actus reus of the offense,”10 and ii) the realization 
of the “aim” is not required to be proven as they are not actus reus for the 
offence. 
2. Mental Elements of the Crime of Genocide under the Korean 
Implementing Legislation 
The phrase “with the aim of destroying” as a statutory expression of 
genocidal intent will give a strong impression to the Korean judges that the 
crime of genocide falls into the category of aim–crime under Korean 
criminal law. The authors are of the opinion that this categorization is 
correct and consistent with the true nature of genocidal intent for the 
reasons articulated below. 
a. Conceptual Distinction between “Intent” and “Aim”
On the basis of the understanding of aim–crime under the Korean Penal 
Code explained above, identifying the exact legal nature of the mental 
elements of genocide in the Korean legal context would help clarify the true 
implication of the wording of “with the aim of destroying.” Before 
embarking on a specific examination of the concept of genocidal intent, it is 
necessary to explore the conceptual distinction between “intent” and “aim.”
In this regard, an observation made by Kwang–Joo Rim, a Korean criminal 
law professor, deserves our attention. He seems to suggest two parameters 
of the distinction between “intent” and “aim”—the direct and full control 
test and concurrence test.11
Based on Rim’s explanation, a definition of “intent” might be advanced 
in which “intent” is a person’s willful state of mind that is directly and fully 
controlling a conduct at the time of the conduct. One cannot, however, 
through his or her will, directly and fully control all the conducts to be 
engaged in by other people. The only object of the person’s direct and full 
control through his or her will can be his or her own conduct. Thus, “intent”
is directed at the person’s own conduct only, not at the conduct to be 
engaged in by other people. Essentially, an intent that I harboured yesterday 
or will harbour tomorrow does not have any meaning in the sense of 
criminal law if my conduct is not accompanied by the intent at the time of
the conduct.   
On the other hand, “aim” is not a state of mind that is directly and fully 
controlling an object in the sense that this state of mind is directed at an 
object in the future. With regard to the object of “aim,” Rim opines that 
 10. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 138. 
 11. Kwang–Joo Rim, Hyongbeob E Itseoso Mokjok Eu Gaenyum Gwa Yoohyong
[The Concept and Types of Aim in Criminal Law], 21 HANYANG L. REV. 45, 47–49 (2004). 
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everything that can be portrayed in a person’s mind can be an object of 
“aim.” Thus, the person’s own conduct can also be an object of “aim” if it is 
supposed to happen in the future. Likewise, the concept of “aim” has a 
capacity to encompass other people’s conduct, which was not the case with 
the concept of “intent” as just explained. This disparity in terms of the 
capacity of the concepts of “aim” and “intent” is crucial for the subsequent 
discussion on genocidal intent.   
The distinction between “intent” and “aim” might be summarized as 
follows: “intent” is a willful state of mind directed at a person’s own 
directly and fully controllable conduct at the time of the conduct, and “aim”
is a willful state of mind directed at an object in the future regardless of 
whether the object is directly and fully controllable or not. Consequently, 
one can only have an “aim” (but not “intent”) vis–à–vis i) other people’s
conduct, or ii) a consequence that requires the involvement of other people 
for it to be realized. Yet, “intent” does not have a capacity to cover these 
two items.  
At this juncture, it is illuminative to see what George Fletcher states on 
the meaning of “intent”:
It accounts for one of the basic principles of criminal responsibility: the 
required union of act and intent. If [yesterday] I ha[d] the intent to steal a 
specific book, and [today] I walk away with the book by mistake, I do not 
steal it. I must have the intent to steal at the very moment that I walk away 
with the book. Or recall the scene from the film Nine to Five: A secretary 
wishes to kill her boss. While preparing him a cup of coffee she 
mistakenly (not accidentally!) puts a substance in the coffee that turns out 
to be poison.  She may have a background plan and even an unconscious 
intention to kill him, but she does not intentionally poison him. What 
counts is not the preliminary or the background or subconscious intention 
of the actor, but the adverbial question: Did the actor intentionally deprive 
the owner of possession of the book or intentionally induce him to drink 
poison? (emphasis added).12
Given the phrases “at the very moment” and “adverbial question,”
Fletcher is obviously of the same view as Rim that the intent must exist at 
the time of conduct, backing the concurrence test. The state of mind 
 12. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 121 (1998). See also 
MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 16 (1999) (“My intention 
will not merely influence my conduct, it will control it. . . . Intentions are, whereas ordinary 
desires are not, conduct–controlling pro–attitudes. Ordinary desires, in contrast, are merely 
potential influencers of action. The volitional dimension of the commitment involved in 
future–directed intention derives from the fact that intentions are conduct controllers.  If my 
future–directed intention manages to survive until the time of action, and I see that that time 
has arrived and nothing interferes, it will control my action then. As a conduct–controlling 
pro–attitude my intention involves a special commitment to action that ordinary desires do 
not.”). It should be kept in mind that Bratman’s “future–directed intention” is not a legal 
notion. Instead, it is a philosophical concept. 
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indicated by the adverb “intentionally” always exists at the very moment 
when a conduct signified by a verb is engaged in. Furthermore, the factual 
examples in this passage are considered to support the validity of the direct 
and full control test—both the person who took the book and the secretary 
who poisoned her boss clearly did not have control over what happened—
they engaged in a conduct and/or caused a consequence by mistake.
b. Two Mental Elements of Genocide—But, no “Double  
Intent” Anymore 
It has been generally thought that the crime of genocide requires two 
separate types of intent—the intent for the underlying conduct and 
genocidal intent to destroy a group.13  In the context of Korean criminal law, 
“instigation”14 is commonly said to require “double intent”—first, “intent to 
instigate” (i.e., intent to create a will to commit a crime in another person’s
mind) and second, “intent to realize the crime through another person.”15 In 
this respect, Rim observes that, although “instigation” indeed has two 
separate mental elements, they are not “double intent” but one “intent” and 
one “aim.”16 If we apply Rim’s criteria of distinction between “intent” and 
“aim” to the case of “instigation,” i) “the instigator’s own conduct of 
instigation”—which is directly and fully controllable by the instigator 
(direct and full control test) at the time of instigating (concurrence test)—is
in no doubt an object of his own intent, and ii) “the realization of the crime 
through another person”—which is not directly and fully controllable by the 
instigator (direct and full control test) and is something to happen in the 
future (concurrence test)—cannot be an object of “intent,” but can only be 
an object of “aim.” Therefore, it seems sound to argue that “instigation” has 
two mental elements of “intent” and “aim,” not “intent” and “intent.” In this 
regard, Rim further takes the examples of the “offence of criminal 
preparation,”17 “offence of conspiracy,”18 and “attempt”19 in respect of 
 13. See, e.g., Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, established pursuant to resolution 
1564 (2004), Report to the United Nations Secretary–General, ¶ 491 (Jan. 25, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, [hereinafter Darfur Report] (stating 
that “the subjective element or mens rea [of genocide] is twofold: (a) the criminal intent 
required for the underlying offence (killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, etc.) and, 
(b) ‘the intent to destroy, in whole or in part’ the group as such.”). 
 14. Korean Penal Code, supra note 4, art. 31(1). 
 15. KIM & SUH, supra note 6, at 640; YIM, supra note 6, at 446. 
 16. Rim, supra note 11, at 49. 
 17. Id. “Intent” directed at the conduct of preparation, and “aim” directed at the 
realization of a crime. 
 18. Id. “Intent” directed at the conspiracy, and “aim” directed at the realization of the 
crime. The term “conspiracy” is a translation of the Korean word “Eum–mo” as provided in 
Article 28 of the Korean Penal Code, which provides, “[w]hen a conspiracy or preparatory 
conduct for a crime has not  reached the commencement of the execution of the crime, the 
person shall not be punished, except as otherwise provided by statute.” Though relevant case 
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which the mental element of “aim” has been mistakenly labeled “intent” by 
many Korean scholars. 
If we analyze the mens rea structure of the crime of genocide, it indeed 
requires two mental elements—intent for the underlying conduct to which 
Article 30 of the ICC Statute applies, and genocidal intent directed at the 
destruction of a group. As to the former, when a person consciously engages 
in one of the underlying conducts provided in Article 6(a)–(e) of the ICC 
Statute, we can safely state that he or she is in possession of “intent” vis-à-
vis the conduct (unless he or she suffers from physical malfunctioning etc). 
That is, the intent exists at the time of the conduct (concurrence test) and the 
person has direct and full control over his or her conduct (direct and full 
control test). On the other hand, with regard to genocidal intent, the 
“destruction” is a future effect or further consequence envisaged in a 
person’s mind (concurrence test). Furthermore, the realization of the 
“destruction” requires the involvement of other people as confirmed by the 
drafters of the Elements of Crimes when they stipulated the phrase “a
manifest pattern of similar conduct,”20 and other people’s conducts are not 
directly and fully controllable (direct and full control test). Thus, genocidal 
intent fails both the concurrence test and the direct and full control test and, 
consequently, cannot be labeled “intent.” As recognized by some members 
of the International Law Commission when they recommended replacing 
the wording “acts committed with intent to destroy” with “acts committed 
with the aim of destroying” or “acts manifestly aimed at destroying” for the 
Article on genocide in the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, genocidal intent should be classified as “aim,” not as 
“intent” “to avoid any ambiguity on this important element of the crime.”21
law in Korea is quite scarce, one might say that the concept of “conspiracy” in Article 28 of 
the Code is i) similar to the conspiracy doctrine of the common law in that it is a substantive 
offence, and ii) distinct from the conspiracy doctrine of the common law in that it does not 
require the element of “overt act.” Note that, under Article 28, the rule is not punishing 
conspiracy. Punishing conspiracy is an exception. For a general overview of the relevant 
theories and case law concerning Article 28 of the Code, see Jong–Ryul Lee & Deok–In Lee, 
Hyong Sa Beob Sang Ye Bi Eum–mo Je E Daehan Je Gumto [A Review on Criminal Offence 
of Conspiracy, Inchoate Crime: Abolition of Offence of Conspiracy and Modification of 
Inchoate Crime], 49 Dong–A U. L. Rev. 137–170 (2010); Jung Hwan Han, Yebi Eum–mo Je 
Eu Sung Rip Yo Gun, Jeok Yong Gi Joon [Die Verabredung und Vorbereitung der Straftat], 
633 Kor. Lawyers Ass’n J. 141–171 (2009). 
 19. Id. “Intent” directed at the initiation of the conduct, and “aim” directed at the 
completion of the crime.  
 20. Report of the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Finalized Draft 
Text of the Elements of Crimes, art. 6, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) 
[hereinafter Elements of Crimes] (describing the objective contextual element of genocide as 
“conduct [which] took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”). 
 21. May 2–July 21, 1995, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. A/50/10; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10 
(2005) (“It was suggested that the Drafting Committee might consider using a formulation 
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3. Difficulties Stemming from the Wording of “With Intent to 
Destroy” 
As of May 2010, the authors are not aware of any other national 
implementing legislation of the ICC Statute that employs the wording of 
“with the aim of destroying” for the purpose of providing genocidal intent.22 
The Act’s unique selection of this wording seems to be a progressive 
development in the area of the law on genocide. To date, the discussion on 
“specific intent,” “special intent (dolus specialis),” or “genocidal intent” has 
been considered difficult and complex, particularly in view of the unique—
and at the same time common—feature of the core international crimes that 
involves the participation of “many people.”  Except for the highly 
exceptional situation envisaged by the second part of the contextual element 
of the crime of genocide provided in the Elements of Crimes (“conduct that 
could itself effect such destruction”),23 is it possible for many Rwandan 
Hutu people who pursued their Tutsi neighbours to universally have the 
“special intent” to destroy? It seems thus far that the term “special intent” 
has been understood by many scholars, lawyers, and international judges as 
more of a stronger intent than a general intent (particularly in terms of the 
volitional aspect of intent). A noteworthy example of such understanding is 
the term “aggravated criminal intention” that appears in the Darfur Report, 
explaining the concept of genocidal intent.24 The usage of the term 
“aggravated criminal intention” in the United States,25 the employment of 
  
such as ‘acts committed with the aim of’ or ‘acts manifestly aimed at destroying’ to avoid 
any ambiguity on this important element of the crime.”). 
 22. Most national implementing legislation of the ICC Statute uses the wording 
“with intent to destroy.” See, e.g., Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 
2000, c. 24, § 4(3) (Can.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/C/C-45.9.pdf; 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 ch. 
5, sched. 1, pt. 1 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a27-02.pdf; 
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002,                               
divs. 268.3–268.7 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/DE14FDCCC9AB239BCA257
4100007FC95/$file/0422002.pdf. It is however noteworthy that, to the authors’ knowledge, 
the only legislation that employs a similar wording as the Korean legislation is the Criminal 
Code of Georgia (Apr. 28, 2006. No. 2937). Article 407 of the Georgian Criminal Code uses 
the phrase, “in order to realize an agreed plan of complete or partial destroying.” (emphasis 
added). The authors are grateful to Georgian lawyer Mr. Ilia Utmelidze of the Norwegian 
Center for Human Rights for providing us with the translation of this provision and sharing 
his observations. 
 23. Elements of Crimes, supra note 20, art. 6. 
 24. Darfur Report, supra note 13, ¶ 491.  
 25. The term “aggravated criminal intent” seems to find its origin in the American 
legal system in which the term has been used to show an added culpability of a person who 
did not comply with a “judicial or administrative warning” or a “special law in the form of a 
formal order, injunction or decree” specifically given to him or her by a judicial or 
governmental authority. See United States v. Linville, 10 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Kubick, 199 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Shadduck, 
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the wordings of “consciously desired,”26 and the additional cognitive 
component of knowledge (“know that . . . would destroy”) all indicate the 
enhanced culpability level of “special intent.” The Darfur Report states:  
[A]n aggravated criminal intention or dolus specialis . . . implies that the 
perpetrator consciously desired the prohibited acts he committed to result 
in the destruction, in whole or in part, of the group as such, and knew that 
his acts would destroy in whole or in part, the group as such (emphasis 
added).27
In the same vein, Kai Ambos says: 
In the civil law tradition, specific intent corresponds to dolus directus of 
first degree, i.e. it emphasizes the volitive element of the dolus.  It has 
been said that an offence with a specific intent requires performance of the 
actus reus in association with an intent or purpose that goes beyond the 
mere performance of the act.  In other words it consists of an aggravated 
criminal intent that must exist in addition to the criminal intent 
accompanying the underlying offence.28
The same line of understanding can also be found in the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals. In its first genocide conviction, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) Trial Chamber in Akayesu
repeatedly uses the word “clear” in explaining the genocidal intent—for 
example, “clearly seeks to produce,” “clear intent to cause,” and “clear 
intent to destroy.”29 The subsequent case law of the ICTR and the 
112 F.3d 523, 529 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Gunderson, 55 F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
 26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1962) (defining four levels of culpability: 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly and negligently. Regarding “purposely” that includes the 
strongest volitional element, the code uses the phrase “the defendant’s conscious object.”). It 
should also be noted that MODEL PENAL CODE §1.13(12) states, “‘intentionally’ or ‘with 
intent’ means ‘purposely.’”
 27. Darfur Report, supra note 13, ¶ 491. 
 28. Kai Ambos, Commentary: Genocidal Intent, in 8 ANNOTATED LEGAL CASES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 423, 424 (André Klip & Göran Sluiter eds., 2005). 
 29. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96–4–T, Judgment, ¶ 498 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(“Special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the 
crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged.”)
(emphasis added); Id. ¶ 518 (“Special intent is a well–known criminal law concept in the 
Roman–continental legal systems. It is required as a constituent element of certain offences 
and demands that the perpetrator have the clear intent to cause the offence charged. 
According to this meaning, special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which 
offence is characterized by a psychological relationship between the physical result and the 
mental state of the perpetrator.”) (emphasis added); Id. ¶ 520 (“With regard to the crime of 
genocide, the offender is culpable only when he has committed one of the offences charged 
under Article 2(2) of the Statute with the clear intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
particular group. The offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act 
committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.”) (emphasis added). See also
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
Appeals Chamber in Kristić have followed the same interpretative 
approach—generally referred to as purpose–based approach to genocidal 
intent (as opposed to knowledge–based approach).30 According to this 
purpose–based approach, the genocidal intent indicates a state of mind that 
“consciously desires” a destruction of a group (not just “desire”), and 
clearly intends the destruction of a group (not just “intend”). It is 
considered, however, that there are some difficulties involving this 
interpretative approach to genocidal intent.  
First, the purpose–based approach tends to contradict the reality of 
genocidal crime–base in which “many people” participate. That is, it is hard 
to imagine a situation where such a strong level of intent would be shared 
by all of those participants covering i) the masterminds at the highest 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR–96–3–T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 59 (Dec. 6, 
1999), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5880.html. As to the Akayesu
Trial Chamber’s opinion that the concept of “special intent” is well–known to the continental 
legal tradition, see a negative response from Claus Kreβ:
This statement quite considerably underestimates the complexity of 
the matter. Neither the ‘Roman–continental systems’ nor the legal 
family of the common law can be relied upon for a clear cut and 
uniform concept of dolus specialis (‘dol special’, ‘special intent’,
‘Absicht’/‘erweiterter Vorsatz’, ‘dolo especifico’, ‘oogmerk op’,
‘amesos dolos/skopos’ etc.) as meaning aim, goal, purpose or desire. 
It is thus highly improbable whether a valid comparative law 
argument could be developed in support of the assertion put forward 
in Akayesu. But apart from this, the definition of genocide does not 
use any of those terms, but simply the word ‘intent’ which leaves the 
necessary room to have due regard to genocide’s specific interplay 
between individual and collective acts. 
Claus Kreβ, The Crime of Genocide under International Law, 6 INT’L CRIM. L.
REV. 461, 494 (2006). 
 30. For discussion on the “purpose–based approach” and the “knowledge–based 
approach” to genocidal intent, see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Note, Rethinking Genocidal 
Intent: The Case for a Knowledge–Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259 (1999); 
Claus Kreβ, The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 562, 565 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kreβ, Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent]; Kreβ, supra note 29, at 492; Hans 
Vest, A Structure–Based Concept of Genocidal Intent, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781, 786 
(2007); Claus Kreβ, The Crime of Genocide and Contextual Elements: A Comment on the 
ICC Pre–Trial Chamber’s Decision in the Al Bashir Case, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 297, 304–
06 (2009); WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES
242 (2009). The following summary made by William Schabas on the two approaches is 
short and clear: “Adoption of a ‘purpose–based’ approach, which dwells on intent, results in 
a focus on individual offenders and their own personal motives. A ‘knowledge–based’
approach, on the other hand, directs the inquiry towards the plan or policy of a State or 
similar group, and highlights the collective dimension of the crime of genocide.” Id. For a 
thorough study of the ICTY jurisprudence on genocidal intent, see Cécile Tournaye, 
Genocidal Intent before the ICTY, 52 INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 447 (2003). 
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organizational structure of power; ii) mid–level commanders who passed 
the instructions/orders; and iii) direct–perpetrators who physically carry out 
the campaign.31 In this respect, Claus Kreβ explains, “[t]he fundamental 
problem of the purpose–based approach thus consists in the combination of 
an actus reus list formulated from the perspective of the subordinate level 
with what is typically a leadership standard of mens rea.”32
Second, the purpose–based approach is likely to entice scholars and 
practitioners to build a causal connection between the underlying conducts 
of genocide as provided in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article 6 of the ICC 
Statute and the notion of “destruction” (apparently treating the “destruction”
as a material element of “consequence”) as implied by the following text:33
At the low end of recklessness, continental jurists speak of dolus 
eventualis, a level of knowledge that must surely be insufficient to 
constitute the crime of genocide . . . A commander accused of committing 
genocide by ‘inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction’, and who was responsible for imposing a 
restricted diet or ordering a forced march, might argue that he or she had 
no knowledge that destruction of the group would indeed be the 
consequence. An approach to the knowledge requirement that considers 
recklessness about the consequence of an act to be equivalent to full 
knowledge provides an answer to such an argument (emphasis added).34
In this text, the notion of “destruction” appears to be regarded as a 
material element (in particular, as a “consequence”). In order to appraise 
this approach, it is necessary to first determine the precise legal identity of 
the notion of “destruction” in the context of the law on genocide. In this 
respect, the wording of “with the aim of destroying” in the Act and the legal 
nature of the aim–crime under the Korean Penal Code indicate that the 
drafters of the legislation considered the notion of “destruction” to be just 
an ingredient of the mental element of “aim to destroy,” and not as a 
separate material element. Thus, it is expected that Korean judges probably 
would not require the showing of the realization of “destruction” for the 
constitution of the crime of genocide, as the “destruction” per se is not actus 
reus.  This understanding of the legal identity of “destruction” being just an 
ingredient of genocidal intent also holds true in international jurisdictions as 
evidenced by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Krajisnik when it described 
 31. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC–02/05–01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, 49 
n. 154 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf. 
 32. Kreβ, supra note 29, at 496. 
 33. It is generally understood that there are three kinds of actus reus under the ICC 
law: “conduct,” “consequence,” and “circumstance.” See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 30. 
See also Elements of Crimes, supra note 20, General Introduction ¶¶ 2, 7. 
 34. SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 260. 
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“[d]estruction as a component of the mens rea of genocide.”35 The scholarly 
hesitation to directly link genocidal intent to the notion of “destruction,”
probably due to advertent or inadvertent realization of the true identity of 
the “destruction” (i.e., not actus reus), is implied in the expressions such as 
“intent to further the destruction of the group,”36 “specific intent with 
respect to overall consequence of the prohibited act,”37  and “the goal or 
manifest effect of the campaign was the destruction.”38 In sum, the notion of 
“destruction” is not actus reus of “consequence” of the underlying conducts, 
and is not therefore required to be materialized.39  Instead, the genocidal 
mens rea is required to be directed at or oriented towards the “destruction”
alone. The “destruction” can only be some effect or further consequence 
beyond the underlying conduct and/or result thereof that fully constitutes the 
actus reus of the crime of genocide.  
In conclusion, the mental element of “aim to destroy” does not attend the 
“destruction” as its corresponding material element. The “aim to destroy” is 
only directed at the “destruction.” The “aim to destroy” contains 
“destruction” only as its conceptual component. The “aim to destroy” stands 
alone as a legal requirement reflecting a state of mind of a person who is 
involved in the crime of genocide. From the viewpoint of substantive law, 
the “destruction” exists only in the abstract. When the case law of the ad
hoc tribunals discussed the destruction of the “substantial part” of a group in 
defining the term “in part,” it did not talk about the material element of 
“consequence.” Instead, what the jurisprudence discussed was the legal 
requirement of genocidal intent being directed at the destruction of a 
substantial part of a group. The realization of the destruction of the 
substantial part of the group in the real world can be significant as a matter 
of evidence.40 It has, however, nothing to do with the constitution of the 
crime of genocide as a matter of substantive law.41
 35. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT–00–39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006). 
The term “mens rea of genocide” in this paragraph should be understood as the special intent 
of genocide, not as mens rea of an underlying conduct of genocide. It should be noted that 
there is a seemingly divergent view expressed by the Krajisnik Trial Chamber when it states, 
“[t]he acts must destroy, or tend to destroy, a substantial part of the group, and the intent 
must be that that part of the group exists no more.” Id. ¶ 866 (emphasis added). The wording 
of “must destroy” that indicates a different identity of “destruction” being an actus reus
(“consequence”) is regrettable as it only causes confusion without serving any other 
purposes.  
 36. Ambos, supra note 28, at 424. 
 37. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc.  
A/51/10; GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996).  
 38. Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 2288. 
 39. See also Ambos, supra note 28, at 424 (expressing the same view when he stated 
“it is irrelevant for the completion of the crime whether the perpetrator is . . . successful in 
destroying the group. . . . He or she needs only intend to achieve this consequence or 
result.”). 
 40. See Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR–2001–71–I,                   
Judgment, ¶ 454 (Jul. 15, 2004), available at
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The substantive legal examination of a genocidal crime–base should be 
done in a three step process—first, at the level of underlying conducts 
concerning both actus reus and mens rea; second, at the level of the 
contextual circumstance of “a manifest pattern of similar conduct”
concerning actus reus (and mens rea on a case by case basis);42 and third, at 
the level of genocidal intent concerning mens rea only.  Article 30 of the 
ICC Statute is applicable to the first level (and the second level on a case by 
case basis) only,43 not to the third level. That is to say, in addition to the fact 
that genocidal intent itself is generally considered as being outside the 
general mental element scheme under Article 30,44 there is no material 
element that can ever be affected by an Article 30 mental element at the 
stage of legal consideration vis-à-vis the genocidal intent at the third level.  
The peculiar legal feature of the absence of any material element at the 
third level also casts doubts on some of the definitions of genocidal intent 
advanced by some scholars in line with the knowledge–based approach, for 
example: 
The question of whether the individual perpetrator must foresee the 
occurrence of the overall destructive result as a substantial certainty also 
arises if the knowledge–based approach to individual genocidal intent is 
adhered to.  It is one thing to know that the collective goal to destroy exists 
and another thing to foresee the goal’s realization as a substantial 
certainty. As mentioned above, the views of the proponents of the 
knowledge-based approach differ: while Vest requires foresight as a 
substantial certainty, Gil Gil holds that dolus eventualis should suffice.  If 
one considers the complex nature and context of the systemic act, it is 
submitted that Gil Gil’s view is more realistic if the definition of genocide 
is to be applied at all.  How this view relates to the ‘awareness that [a 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,ICTR,CASELAW,,48abd5150,0.html 
(“The actual destruction of a substantial part of the group is not a required material element 
of the offence, but may assist in determining whether the accused intended to bring about 
that result.”).
 41. See id.
 42. Elements of Crimes provides that mens rea regarding this material element of 
“circumstance,” if any, “will need to be decided by the Court on a case–by–case basis.” See
Elements of Crimes, supra note 20, intro. to art. 6. 
 43. If the ICC judges acknowledged mens rea regarding the contextual circumstance 
of “manifest pattern of similar conduct” on a case–by–case basis, then Article 30 will also 
apply thereto. See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 30. 
 44. In other words, genocidal intent falls into the mental element category of 
“otherwise provided” in Article 30 of the ICC Statute.  See Gerhard Werle & Florian 
Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental 
Element of Crimes Under International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 35, 48–49 
(2005) (“Numerous provisions of the ICC Statute include additional subjective requirements 
that, unlike ‘intent and knowledge’ under Article 30 ICCSt., do not necessarily refer to a 
material element of the crime, such as conduct, consequence or circumstance. The most 
important example concerns the ‘intent to destroy’ element of genocide pursuant to Article 6 
ICCSt.”).
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consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events’ within the 
meaning of Article 30(2)(a) ICCSt. is a matter that cannot be pursued here 
any further.  In conclusion, it is suggested that the individual perpetrator 
must act with dolus eventualis regarding the eventual destructive result.  
We would thus propose, for the typical case of genocide, that individual 
genocidal intent requires (a) knowledge of a collective attack directed to 
the destruction at least part of a protected group, and (b) dolus eventualis 
as regards the occurrence of such destruction (emphasis added).45 
In this context, since there is no material element—especially the 
“consequence”—to be affected by genocidal intent at the third level, it is 
doubtful whether there is any room for dolus eventualis or “foresight as a 
substantial certainty” to intervene and play a role as a sub–requirement of 
the genocidal intent. This is because the discussion of the applicability of 
dolus eventualis or “foresight as a substantial certainty” presumes that the 
“destruction” is a material element (“consequence”) corresponding thereto. 
In other words, if we take this approach, the realization of the “destruction” 
would become a key factor to distinguish the “attempt” of the crime of 
genocide and the “completion” thereof, which cannot survive a simple 
scrutiny of case law and scholarly works.46 That is, an “attempted 
destruction” is sufficient for the conviction of the “completion” of the crime 
of genocide.47 Since the “destruction” is only an ingredient of a mental 
element (i.e., genocidal intent), the text cited above appears to mistakenly 
try attaching a mental element (i.e., dolus eventualis or “foresight as a 
substantial certainty”) to another mental element (i.e., destruction). 
In this respect, the definition of genocidal intent (based on the 
knowledge–based approach), as originally suggested by Greenawalt, may be 
considered more consistent with at least the distinct feature of the absence 
of any material element at the third level.48 The legal identity of the concept 
  
 45. Kreβ, Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent, supra note 30, at 577. 
 46. GERHARD WERLE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 205 
(2005) (“promote the misunderstanding that the total or partial destruction of the group . . . is 
necessary for genocide”). 
 47. The notions of “attempted destruction” and “attempt of the crime of genocide” 
are distinct to each other. See Prosecutor v. Gacumbtsi, Case No. ICTR 2001–64–T, 
Judgment, ¶ 253 (Jun. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Gacumbitsi/Decision/040617-judgement.pdf
(“There is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish genocide, even though the 
relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group, by any act 
listed in Article 2 of the Statute, is strong evidence to prove the necessary intent to destroy a 
group in whole or in part.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). It is considered that the 
“attempt of the crime of genocide” should be discussed only in connection with the material 
elements (“conduct” and/or “consequence”) of the underlying acts provided in Article 6(a)–
(e) ICCSt, not with genocidal intent. 
 48. Greenawalt suggests a knowledge–based definition. Greenawalt, supra note 30, 
at 2288. (“In cases where a perpetrator is otherwise liable for a genocidal act, the 
requirement of genocidal intent should be satisfied if the perpetrator acted in furtherance of a 
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of “destruction” as being a component of mens rea (i.e., genocidal intent) 
seems more compatible with the terms “manifest effect”49 or “destructive 
effect”50 used by Greenawalt than other expressions like “destructive result.”
The term “knowledge–based interpretation” proposed by Greenawalt might 
be paraphrased as “knowledge (of the further effect)–based interpretation,”
not “knowledge (of the result)–based interpretation.”
4. From “Genocidal Intent” to “Genocidal Plan”:
Objectification of the Concept of “Genocidal Intent”
To the extent that, within the knowledge–based approach, an emphasis is 
placed on the “destruction” as being only a further effect (as opposed to a 
“result” or “consequence”) of a genocidal campaign, the adoption of the 
wording “with the aim of destroying” in the Act is congruent with the 
knowledge–based approach.  Emphasizing the need to distinguish between a 
“collective intent” and an “individual intent,” Claus Kreβ explains the crux 
of the knowledge–based approach as follows: 
The collective intent [as opposed to individual intent] can best be defined 
as the goal or the objective behind a concerted campaign to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a protected group.  Such goal or objective may well have 
originated from the desire of one or more individual directors but it will 
then acquire an impersonal, objective existence (most usefully referred to 
as the “overall genocidal plan”) . . . Yet it is not such a desire of an 
individual that hallmarks genocide as the horrible crime it is.  It is the 
dimension of the collective genocidal goal that every individual participant 
takes the conscious decision to further (emphasis added).51
Our experience in the Twentieth Century tells us that the crime of 
genocide is, together with crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
committed by “many people.” The contextual elements of “widespread or 
systematic attack,” “state or organizational policy,” and “the existence of 
campaign targeting members of a protected group and knew that the goal or manifest effect
of the campaign was the destruction of the group in whole or in part.”) (emphasis added). 
 49. Id.
 50. Id. at 2291 (suggesting that “culpability [can be] based on knowledge of 
destructive effect”).
 51. Kreβ, supra note 29, at 495–97 (citing Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.               
IT–98–33–T, Judgment, ¶ 549 (Aug. 2, 2001) (“As a preliminary, the Chamber emphasizes 
the need to distinguish between the individual intent of the accused and the intent involved in 
the conception and commission of the crime. The gravity and the scale of the crime of 
genocide ordinarily presume that several protagonists were involved in its perpetration. 
Although the motive of each participant may differ, the objective of the criminal enterprise 
remains the same. In such cases of joint participation, the intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a group as such must be discernible in the criminal act itself, apart from the intent of 
particular perpetrators.”)).  
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armed conflict” all require a circumstance of a legally meaningful scale. 
And the factual bottom line of that “circumstance of a legally meaningful 
scale” seems to be the involvement of “many people.” As mentioned above, 
encountering the word with rather strong volitional connotation—that is, 
“intent (to destroy)”—this factual feature of the involvement of “many 
people” has made the discussion of “genocidal intent” difficult and 
confusing especially when one follows the purpose–based approach. 
Challenging the purpose–based approach, the knowledge–based approach 
highlights that a perpetrator’s knowledge of the collective plan to destroy a 
group is the key element of genocidal intent.  In this way, the concept of 
genocidal intent has been objectified towards the “impersonal [and] 
objective existence” of “overall genocidal plan” advertently (mostly by 
scholars through the introduction of the knowledge–based approach) and 
inadvertently (mostly by international judges “through the evidentiary 
backdoor”).52 For the notion of genocidal intent under the knowledge–based 
approach, the proposition put forth by David Luban stands firm—“without a 
plan there is no intention.”53
5. Significance of the New Wording Adopted by the Korean 
Implementing Legislation 
The concepts of “aim” (in the wording of “with the aim of destroying”)
and “plan” (in the term “overall genocidal plan”) share the same definitional 
feature of being directed at an object that perceptually exists in the future.
As examined above in Part I (A)(2)(a), this definitional feature cannot be 
shared by the notion of “intent” as it must be directed at an object that 
conceptually exists at that very moment of the conduct. For this reason, 
“genocidal intent” that is legally required to be directed to a future effect of 
 52. Kreβ, Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent, supra note 30, at 571–72. 
53. David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, 
and the UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 312 (2006).  See also Michael Bratman, Moore of 
Intention and Volition, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1705, 1708–09 (1994) (“I believe that future–
directed intentions play a central, coordinating role in our psychology, both individual and 
social, and that it is an error to ignore them in theorizing about intelligent agency. In 
particular, we are planning agents. We frequently settle in advance on partial plans for the 
future, and these plans then guide and structure later planning and action. We do not only 
reason about what to do now, but frequently try to decide now what to do at some later time, 
and then figure out what to do in the interim given our decision about that later time . . . . Our 
planning capacities—capacities at the heart of our ability to achieve complex forms of 
organization, both individual and social—mark off a distinctive species of intelligent agency. 
Planning is the key to intention: future–directed intentions are typically elements of partial 
plans.”) (second emphasis added). It deserves our attention that Bratman makes a distinction 
between “plans as abstract structures (plan)” and “plans as mental states (having a plan).” He 
clarifies that the term “plan” for the usage in his literature falls into the latter, i.e., “mental 
states involving an appropriate sort of commitment to action: I have a plan to A only if it is 
true of me that I plan to A. Plans, so understood, are intentions writ large.” See Bratman, 
supra note 12, at 28–29. 
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the “destruction of a group” cannot be conceptually captured by the concept 
of “intent.” In this sense, the term “genocidal intent” is itself linguistically 
flawed, and has become a false friend, just like “expérience” in French 
means “experiment,” not “experience.”54
In this connection, the wording “with the aim of destroying” in Article 8 
of the Act seems to correctly reflect the legal and factual reality surrounding 
the false friend “genocidal intent,” and makes it clear that the notion of the 
“destruction of a group” is an ingredient of mens rea. This observation is 
also considered consonant with the Lemkin’s purpose: 
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate 
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all 
members of a nation.  It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of 
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the 
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves 
(emphasis added).55
B. Crimes Against Humanity 
Article 9 of the Act provides each of the eleven types of acts referred to 
in Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute with regard to the contextual element of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population 
pursuant to a State or organizational policy. Concerning the possible 
penalties, Article 9(1) stipulates that in case of murder, the perpetrator 
should be punished by capital punishment, life–imprisonment, or 
imprisonment of no less than seven years. For all other acts, Article 9(2) 
provides life–imprisonment or imprisonment of no less than five years. It 
should also be noted that—in a case where a victim died as a result of any 
types of acts other than murder—Article 9(4) provides that the perpetrator is 
to be punished by the same range of sentences as provided in Article 9(1) 
(murder).  
In terms of substantive law, there is only one aspect the authors wish to 
discuss. As to the crime against humanity of extermination, the definition 
thereof in the Act is quite different from that of the ICC law. First of all, it 
must be noted that the Act does not provide the title word “extermination.”
Instead, it only stipulates the definition in an explanatory phrase. Article 
7(2)(b) of the ICC Statute provides, “‘Extermination’ includes the 
intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of 
access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of 
part of a population.” The wording of Article 9(2)(1) of the Act is the exact 
translation of Article 7(2)(b) of the ICC Statute except for the fact that it 
omits the phrase “[e]xtermination includes.” The ramification of this 
 54. Luban, supra note 53, at 303–07. 
 55. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION:
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT: PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944). 
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omission is quite significant. That is, this omission has transformed the legal 
nature of the crime against humanity of extermination from a “result crime”
(requiring the material element of “consequence”—i.e., one or more 
person’s death) to a “conduct crime” (being completed by the material 
element of “conduct” only—i.e., “infliction”). In other words, the basic 
conduct type of the crime of extermination (“killing”)56 is missing, let alone 
the “mass killing”57 requirement. Although the Elements of Crimes can be 
consulted for the interpretation and application of the crimes provided in the 
Act,58 a relevant revision is recommended to ensure the principle of legality. 
C. War Crimes 
The Act spells out war crimes in five separate provisions: Article 10 (war 
crimes against persons); Article 11 (war crimes against property and other 
rights); Article 12 (war crimes against humanitarian operations and 
emblems); Article 13 (war crimes concerning prohibited methods of 
warfare); and Article 14 (war crimes concerning prohibited weapons of 
warfare). The most distinctive feature of the war crimes provisions in the 
Act is that the scope of applicability of quite a number of offences only 
applicable to international armed conflict under the ICC Statute has been 
expanded to non–international armed conflict. This is considered to be a 
positive development made by the Act in that it would broaden the range of 
protection under international humanitarian law under the Korean 
jurisdiction. On the other hand—as a negative side of the war crimes 
provisions in the Act—the authors might point out that the phrase “a person 
who is protected under international humanitarian law” frequently used in 
the war crimes provisions sometimes unnecessarily limits the ambit of 
protection vis-à-vis the offences that originally do not require such a 
qualification for them to be constituted as a war crime under the ICC 
Statute. We will discuss the relevant provisions below. 
 56. Elements of Crimes, supra note 20, art. 7(1)(b)1. The following clarification 
from the ICTR Appeals Chamber well explains the basic conduct type of “killing”: “Murder 
as a crime against humanity does not contain a materially distinct element from 
extermination as a crime against humanity; each involves killing within the context of a 
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, and the only element that 
distinguishes these offences is the requirement of the offence of extermination that the 
killings occur on a mass scale.” See Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, ICTR–
96–10–A and ICTR–96–17–A, Judgment, ¶ 542 (Dec. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ICTR,,,48abd5a610,0.html. See also Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR–95–1–T, Judgment, ¶ 142 (May 21, 1999) (“The 
Chamber agrees that the difference between murder and extermination is the scale; 
extermination can be said to be murder on a massive scale.”). 
 57. Elements of Crimes, supra note 20, art. 7(1)(b)2. 
 58. Act, supra note 1, art. 18. 
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1. Article 10: War Crimes against Persons 
The Act contains quite comprehensive provisions of war crimes against 
persons. Considering the list of war crimes against persons of the ICC 
Statute, it appears that the war crimes of “inhuman treatment” (Article 
8(2)(a)(ii) ICCSt.), “cruel treatment” (Article 8(2)(c)(i) ICCSt.), “biological 
experiment” (Article 8(2)(a)(ii) ICCSt.), “sentencing or execution without 
due process” (Article 8(2)(c)(iv) ICCSt.), and “ordering the displacement of 
civilians” (Article 8(2)(e)(viii) ICCSt.) are the offences omitted in the Act. 
Among these offences, it is especially regrettable that inhuman treatment 
under Article 8(2)(a)(ii) and cruel treatment under Article 8(2)(c)(i) are 
excluded in the Act, given that i) both of them are treated as independent 
offences possessing distinct elements from other offences provided in the 
Articles 8(2)(a)(ii) and 8(2)(c)(i) respectively, and ii) they could have been 
a sort of catch–all provision to be invoked when an alleged torture incident 
fails to satisfy the “prohibited purpose” element.59  One might also point out 
the significance of the offence of “ordering the displacement of civilians”
not being provided in the Act, particularly in view of the recent pattern of 
attacks against a civilian population in non–international armed conflicts—
in other words, like “ethnic cleansing.” Moreover, by providing the 
conduct–type of “ordering,” this offence is directly targeting the high–
ranking government or military officials who are most likely to be pursued 
by national jurisdictions implementing the ICC Statute. 
Comparing Article 10 of the Act with Article 8 of the ICC Statute, there 
are two offences under Article 10 where the scope of protection has been 
stretched to non–international armed conflict. Namely, Article 10(2)2 and 
Article 10(3)1 respectively provide that the offences of “wilfully causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or health”60 and “deportation or 
transfer”61 is applicable to non–international armed conflict.  To the 
contrary, Article 10(2)3 concerning sexual offences—including rape—
seems to restrict the scope of application as it provides, “[c]onduct that 
makes a person who is protected under international humanitarian law to 
be an object of rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy 
or enforced sterilization.”62 This additional requirement that the alleged 
victim be “protected under international humanitarian law” in order for the 
constitution of the sexual offences under Article 10(2)3 does not exist in 
 59. The only “materially distinct element” in between the war crime of torture and 
inhuman (or cruel) treatment is the “prohibited purpose” element of torture. That is, for the 
war crime of torture, the Elements of Crimes requires, “[t]he perpetrator inflicted the pain or 
suffering for such purposes as: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, 
intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kin.” Elements of 
Crimes, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(a)(ii)–1.
 60. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(a)(iii). 
 61. Id. arts. 8(2)(a)(vii), 8(2)(b)(viii). 
 62. Authors’ translation from the original text in Korean. 
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Article 8 of the ICC Statute. That is to say, the war crimes of sexual 
offences in the ICC Statute are provided under the sub–paragraphs (b) and 
(e) of the ICC Statute’s Article 8(2) and, for these sub–paragraphs, there are 
no such limitations in terms of victims’ status like “against persons . . .  
protected under the provisions the relevant Geneva Convention” (Article 
8(2)(a) ICCSt.) or “against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other 
cause” (Article 8(2)(c) ICCSt.). The scope of potential victims of the crimes 
under Article 8(2)(a) and (c) of the ICC Statute as circumscribed by these 
two phrases (respectively for international armed conflict and non–
international armed conflict) is almost the same with that of the phrase “a
person who is protected under international humanitarian law” as defined in 
Article 2.7 of the Act. It is considered that Article 10(2)3 prescribing sexual 
offences conflicts with the ICC Statute to the extent that this provision is 
interpreted in a way that a conduct can constitute a relevant crime only if it 
is committed against a person protected under international humanitarian 
law. The same holds true for the crime of medical and scientific 
experiments provided in Article 10(3)3 of the Act with the same restriction 
of “a person who is protected under international humanitarian law”
because the corresponding provisions in the ICC Statute are provided in the 
sub–paragraphs (b) and (e) of Article 8.  
2. Other War Crimes Provisions 
There are three additional provisions of war crimes—Article 12 (“war 
crimes against humanitarian operations and emblems”); Article 13 (“war 
crimes of using prohibited methods of warfare”); and Article 14 (“war
crimes of using prohibited weapons”). For this part of the Act, there are 
some features to be noted.  
First, the following offences only applicable to international armed 
conflict in the ICC Statute are also applicable to non–international armed 
conflict under the relevant provisions in Article 12, 13 and 14: the “war 
crime of improper use of a flag of a truce, etc.” as provided in Article 
8(2)(b)(vii) ICCSt.;63 the “war crime of excessive incidental death, injury or 
damage” as provided in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) ICCSt.;64 the “war crime of using 
protected persons as [a] shield” as provided in Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) 
ICCSt.;65 the “war crime of starvation as a method of warfare” as provided 
in Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) ICCSt.;66 the “war crime of employing poison or 
 63. Act, supra note 1, art. 12(2). 
 64. Id. arts. 13(1)3, 13(3). 
 65. Id. art. 13(1)4. 
 66. Id. art. 13(1)5. 
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poisoned weapons” as provided in Article 8(2)(b)(xvii) ICCSt.;67 and the 
“war crime of employing prohibited bullets” as provided in Article 
8(2)(b)(xix).68 At this juncture, it is notable that, with respect to these last 
two items of prohibited weapons, the delegations at the ICC Review 
Conference in 2010 also agreed to extend the scope of protection to non–
international armed conflict.69
Second, the offence of “employing gases, liquids, materials and devices”
(Articles 8(2)(b)(xviii) ICCSt.) and the offence of employing means of 
warfare “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”
(Article 8(2)(xx) ICCSt.) are not provided in the Act. Instead, quite 
significantly, the use of biological or chemical weapons is provided as an 
offence applicable to both international and non–international armed 
conflict in the Act’s Article 14(1)2, which provides for the penalty of life–
imprisonment or imprisonment of no less than five years. In this connection, 
another legislative implementation of an international treaty into South 
Korean law must also be noted. That is, the Korean implementing 
legislation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention,70 which prohibits the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of biological and chemical weapons.71 It deserves our 
attention that this legislation also has a set of penal provisions that 
criminalizes, inter alia, the conduct of developing, producing, stockpiling, 
or using biological or chemical weapons with the penalty of life–
imprisonment or imprisonment of no less than five years.72 A person who 
aids or instigates the said conduct is also to receive the same penalty.73 It is 
interesting to see that the domestic crime of developing, producing, 
stockpiling or using biological or chemical weapons is to be punished with 
the same penalty as the offence of the use of biological or chemical 
weapons as provided in Article 14(1)2 of the Act. As to the omitted offence 
concerning the weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering and 
indiscriminate effect as provided in the ICC Statute’s Article 8(2)(b)(xx), it 
is recommended that the Act include this offence sooner or later. Although 
this provision of the ICC Statute has not been entered into force, its 
expected effect to cover the weapons of mass destruction should be 
valued.74
 67. Id. art. 14(1)1. 
 68. Id. art. 14(1)3. 
 69. See Rome Statute Review Conference Res. RC/Res.5 (June 16, 2010), available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf. 
 70. Hwahak saengmool moogi eu gumji mit tukjeong whahak moojil saengmool 
jakyoungjae dung eu chaejo soochulip gyujae dung e gwanhan beobryul [Act on the 
Prohibition of Biological and Chemical Weapons], Act. No. 5162, Aug. 16, 1996, amended 
by Act. No. 9932, Jan. 18, 2010 (S. Kor.). 
 71. Id. art. 4–2.
 72. Id. art. 25(1). 
 73. Id.
 74. WERLE, supra note 46, at 374. 
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D. Modes of Liability 
The Act does not have any provisions for modes of liability. It is, 
therefore, necessary to apply the relevant provisions under the Korean Penal 
Code for the actual prosecution of the crimes newly introduced by the Act. 
In the Code, applicable modes of liability are prescribed under Section 3.  
The Section provides four kinds of modes of liability as follows: co–
perpetration,75 instigation,76 aiding and abetting,77 and indirect 
perpetration.78 Thus, one might say that the modes of liability under Article 
 75. Korean Penal Code, supra note 4, art. 30 (“When two or more persons have 
jointly committed a crime, each of them shall be punished as a principal for the crime 
committed.”).
 76. Id. art. 31:  
Article 31 (Instigation) 
(1) A person who instigated another person to commit a crime shall 
be punished by the same sentence as the one who executed the crime. 
(2) When the person who was instigated consented to the execution 
of a crime and did not commence the execution thereof, the penalty 
for conspiracy or preparation shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
instigator and the instigated person. 
(3) Even when the instigated person did not consent to the execution 
of a crime, the preceding paragraph shall apply to the instigator. 
77. Id. art. 32: 
Article 32 (Accessory) 
(1) Those who aided and abetted another person’s commission of a 
crime shall be punished as accessory. 
(2) The sentence of accessory shall be mitigated to less than that of 
the principals. 
 78. Id. art. 34:  
Article 34 (Indirect perpetration; Aggravation of punishment for 
particular instigation or aiding and abetting).  
(1) A person who have the result of a criminal conduct caused by 
instigating or aiding and abetting another person who is not 
punishable for such conduct or is punishable for negligence, shall be 
punished pursuant to the provision for instigation or aiding and 
abetting. 
(2) A person who causes the result envisaged in the preceding 
paragraph by instigating or aiding and abetting another person who is 
under his command or supervision, shall be punished by increasing 
up to one half of the maximum term or maximum amount of penalty 
provided for the principal in the case of instigation, and with the 
penalty provided for the principal in the case of aiding and abetting. 
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28(3) of the ICC Statute are mostly covered by Section 3 of the Korean 
Penal Code, except for the common purpose liability in Article 28(3)(d) of 
the ICC Statute. The direct and pubic incitement to commit genocide is also 
applicable in Korea, as Article 8 of the Act has a specific provision thereof 
in paragraph 4.  
With regard to the issue of modes of liability, for the past fifteen years 
we have seen enduring efforts of international criminal courts to label the 
high ranking officials most responsible for heinous crimes as a principal, 
not as an accessory. The doctrine of “joint criminal enterprise” invented by 
the Tadić Appeals Chamber,79 and the functional control theory introduced 
by the Stakić Trial Chamber80—which was subsequently adopted by the 
ICC Pre–Trial Chamber in Lubanga,81 are the examples of such efforts 
made by international judges targeting those high up behind the crime scene 
who are holding ultimate control. Is there any corresponding mode of 
liability under Korean criminal law?  
The so–called “conspiracy co–perpetration” under Korean criminal law 
seems to be closest to the co–perpetration liabilities from international 
courts. The concept of “conspiracy co-perpetration” generally expresses that 
a person who only participated in the planning stage, but not in the 
execution of criminal conduct, can also be a co-perpetrator.82 This form of 
criminal participation has introduced by judicial decisions (not by 
legislation)—especially for the purpose of punishing the masterminds of 
organized crimes who are usually away from the actual crime scene. As the 
“joint criminal enterprise” theory—which is heavily based on the common 
law concept of “conspiracy”—has been criticized from the perspective of 
 79. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1–A, Judgment, ¶¶ 185-236 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
 80. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT–97–24–A, Judgment, ¶¶ 431–442 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22 2006), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ICTY,,HRV,4562d8b62,47fdfb550,0.html. The 
initiative of the Stakic Trial Chamber to introduce the “functional control” theory under the 
title of “co–perpetratorship” was blocked by the Appeals Chamber that reaffirmed the 
validity of the doctrine of “joint criminal enterprise.” See also Prosecutor v. Stakić, ¶¶ 58–
63. For more about the “functional control” or “joint control” theory, see Héctor Olásolo & 
Ana Pérez Cepeda, The Notion of Control of the Crime and its Application by the ICTY in the 
Stakic Case, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 475 (2004); Héctor Olásolo, Reflections on the Treatment 
of the Notions of Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Stakić Appeal 
Judgment, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 143 (2007). 
 81. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC–01/04–01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 322–367 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF [hereinafter Lubanga Charges Decision]. See also
Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 953, 961–63 (2007). 
 82. KIM & SUH, supra note 6, at 600; JONG–DAE BAE, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL 
PART 578 (2008); YIM, supra note 6, at 411. 
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the principle of legality, the “conspiracy co–perpetration” theory is also 
generally disapproved by Korean scholars for the reasons that this theory: i) 
is against the principle of legality as the co–perpetration provision of the 
Korean Penal Code requires a “fact of co–execution;”83 ii) will culminate in 
a denial of the distinction between “principal” and “accessory” through the 
groundless extension of the concept of “co–perpetration;”84 iii) will cause 
judicial idleness through sweeping classification of “co–perpetration”
against the clear distinction between “co–perpetration” on one side and 
“instigation”/“aiding and abetting” on the other under the Korean Penal 
Code;85 and iv) will invalidate the burden of proof imposed on the 
prosecution who does not need to prove the substance of co–perpetratorship 
of each participant in a conspiracy.86 For these reasons, Korean scholars 
disapprove the concept of conspiracy co–perpetration and instead suggest a 
solution on the basis of the functional control theory that originated from 
Germany. What they strongly propose is that the high ranking officials or 
masterminds of organized crimes who did not directly participate in the 
conduct of a crime can still be punished as a co–perpetrator on the grounds 
of their “essential contribution” or “essential control” vis-à-vis the criminal 
conduct. At this juncture, it is interesting to note how the relevant 
discussion in Korea is similar to that in the ICC. 
Until recently the stance of the Korean Supreme Court had been firm on 
the issue of “conspiracy co–perpetration.” It seems, however, the Court has 
started to move toward the functional control theory. The following 
statement by the Court is illuminative: 
The co–perpetration under article 30 [of the Korean Penal Code] is to be 
constituted through the mental element of common purpose and the 
material element of execution of a crime through the functional control 
based on the [mental element of] common purpose.  A conspirator who did 
not share any part of a criminal conduct and thereby did not perform any 
conduct can still be culpable as a ‘conspiracy co–perpetrator’, as the case 
may be. [‘Conspiracy co–perpetration is to be acknowledged] only when 
[the court] is satisfied that there exists a functional control through 
essential contribution to the crime in view of the totality of [the facts such 
as] the status and role assumed by the conspirator, and the extent of [his or 
her] domination and power to control vis-à-vis the progress of the crime 
(emphasis added).87
 83. YIM, supra note 6, at 414. 
 84. BAE, supra note 82, at 582; YIM, supra note 6, at 415. 
 85. BAE, supra note 82, at 582; YIM, supra note 6, at 415. 
 86. BAE, supra note 82, at 582. 
 87. See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do7312, Jan. 28, 2010 (S. Kor.); Supreme 
Court [S. Ct.], 2009Do2994, June 23, 2009 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Do6551, 
Feb. 12, 2009 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Do6075, Nov. 15, 2007 (S. Kor.); 
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Do235, Apr. 26, 2007 (S. Kor.). The term “functional control”
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Given the striking similarity between the wording employed in this 
decision and that of the ICC in Lubanga—particularly with respect to the 
terms “functional (or joint) control” and “essential contribution”88—it is 
considered that the jurisprudential basis for holding masterminds of mass 
atrocities accountable as a principal under the mode of liability of “co–
perpetration” based on the functional control theory is being prepared in 
Korea. 
E. Command and Superior Responsibility 
Articles 5 and 15 of the Act provide as follows: 
Article 5 (Responsibility of commanders and other superiors)  
A military commander (including any person who is actually exercising 
the authority as a military commander.  Hereafter, the same applies) or 
superior of a group or organization (including any person who is actually 
exercising the authority of superior.  Hereafter, the same applies.) shall be 
punished with the penalties as provided for in each relevant provision, 
apart from punishing the perpetrators, if he or she did not take an 
appropriate measure needed to prevent subordinates under his or her 
effective command and control from committing genocide or other crimes 
even though he or she knew that the forces were committing or about to 
commit such crimes. 
Article 15 (offences violating the duty of commanders and other superiors) 
(1) Any person who, as a military commander or superior of a group or 
institution, through his or her idleness or dereliction of duty, failed to 
prevent or repress the commission of genocide or other crimes committed 
by subordinates under his or her effective command and control shall be 
punished with imprisonment of not more than 7 years. 
(2) Any person who commits the conduct provided in paragraph (1) by 
negligence shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than 5 years. 
(3) Any person, as a military commander or superior of a group or 
institution, who did not report the subordinates under his or her effective 
command and control who committed genocide or other crimes to an 
in the context of co–perpetration appears in a decision of the Seoul High Court already in 
1988. See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 88No938, June 10, 1988 (S. Kor.). Yet, the 
substantive discussion of “functional control” in conjunction with the notion of “essential 
contribution” can be found in case law since 2007. For more details, see Ho Jin Choi, Gi
Nung Jeok Haengwi Jibae Wa Gongmo Gongdong Jeongbum [Functional Control and 
Conspiracy Co–Perpetration], 32 KYUNGPOOK NAT’L. U. L. J. 631, 631–55 (2010). 
 88. Lubanga Charges Decision, ¶¶ 322–367. 
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investigative authority shall be punished with imprisonment not more than 
5 years. 
As noted above, there are two provisions in the Act relating to the 
command and superior responsibility (command responsibility): Article 5 
and Article 15. The legal nature of both Articles 5 and 15 is “omission.” For 
the purpose of this section’s discussion, it would be helpful at the outset to 
note that, under Korean criminal law, there are two categories of “omission”
classified on the basis of the relevant mental element: “omission by intent”
and “omission by negligence.” Since the way criminal responsibilities of 
commander/superior are provided in Articles 5 and 15 of the Act are a bit 
complicated—if not confusing—the authors consider it appropriate to 
summarize here the major conclusions to be reached through the legal 
analysis in this section on command responsibility:  
Whereas Article 5 should be viewed as providing a mode of liability,      
Article 15 prescribes substantive offences. 
Article 5 provides for command responsibility in the traditional sense.  
It should be noted, however, that the Koreanized doctrine of command 
responsibility as provided in Article 5 includes the limb of the “failure to 
prevent” only (but not “failure to punish”), and the mental element of 
“knowledge” only (but not “should have known” or “consciously 
disregard”). The legal nature of Article 5 is “omission by intent” in 
“failing to prevent.”
Article 15 should be regarded as a provision outside the scope of the 
Koreanized command responsibility as provided in Article 5. Instead, 
Article 15 titled “offences violating the duty of commanders and other 
superiors” prescribes three kinds of separate and independent substantive 
offences as follows: i) offence of “omission by intent” in “failing to 
prevent” (Article 15(1)); ii) offence of “omission by negligence” in 
“failing to prevent” (Article 15(2)); and iii) offence of (seemingly) both 
“omission by intent” and “omission by negligence” in “failing to report” 
(Article 15(3)); 
Though the wording is slightly different from each other, Article 5 and 
Article 15(1) are the same—sharing the same key elements. The common 
legal nature of both provisions is “omission by intent” in “failing to 
prevent.” Despite this essentially identical nature, it is difficult to 
understand the conspicuous disparity in terms of the penalty provided in 
each provision. It is recommended that Article 15(1) should be deleted. 
In view of its close relationship with the crimes committed by 
subordinate, it is difficult to consider Article 15(2) (“omission by 
negligence” in “failing to prevent”) as a separate substantive offence.  
Thus, it should remain as a mode of liability, and be relocated to Article 5. 
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 Thus, Article 15(3) of “failing to report” type command responsibility 
should stay under Article 15 as the only separate substantive offence. 
The legal reasoning through which these conclusions have been drawn 
will be articulated below. 
1. Article 5: “Failure to Prevent” as a Mode of Liability 
Article 5, “Responsibility of commanders and other superiors,” a 
verbatim repetition of that of Article 28 of the ICC Statute, represents the 
doctrine of command responsibility in the traditional sense.  There are some 
features distinctive to Article 5 of the Act vis-à-vis the doctrine under 
Article 28 of the ICC Statute.  
First, as to mens rea, by eliminating the second leg of mental elements in 
Article 28, (i.e., “should have known” and “consciously disregarded 
information”) Article 5 of the Act leaves no room for negligence–based 
superior responsibility to intervene. Consequently, in the Korean criminal 
law context where there are two categories of omission classified on the 
basis of mens rea, (i.e., “omission by intent” and “omission by 
negligence”), the command responsibility under Article 5 has no other 
option but to fall into the former. Put differently, what Article 5 of the Act 
requires is that a commander/superior intentionally fails to prevent the 
crimes by subordinates despite his knowledge thereof. This requirement is 
similar to that of the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Bagilishema in that a 
commander or superior is to be held responsible under the doctrine of 
command responsibility “either by deliberately failing to perform [his duty] 
or by culpably or willfully disregarding [it].”89 The second unique feature of 
command responsibility under the Act is that Article 5 prescribes only the 
“failure to prevent”–type command responsibility. On the other hand, as 
will be discussed below, the “failure to punish”–type is provided in Article 
15(3) as a separate substantive offence. Thirdly, we should pay attention to 
the provision concerning the penalty in Article 5, as it indicates an 
important legal characteristic of the command responsibility under the Act. 
It provides that a commander/superior “. . . shall be punished with the 
 89. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95–1A–A, Judgment, ¶ 35 (July 3, 
2002) (emphasis added) (“References to ‘negligence’ in the context of superior responsibility 
are likely to lead to confusion of thought, as the Judgement of the Trial Chamber in the 
present case illustrates.  The law imposes upon a superior a duty to prevent crimes which he 
knows or has reason to know were about to be committed, and to punish crimes which he 
knows or has reason to know had been committed, by subordinates over whom he has 
effective control. A military commander, or a civilian superior, may therefore be held 
responsible if he fails to discharge his duties as a superior either by deliberately failing to 
perform them or by culpably or willfully disregarding them.”). This view was later expressly 
endorsed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Blaskić case. See Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case 
No. IT–95–14–A, Judgment, ¶ 63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 
2004), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf. 
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penalties as provided for in each relevant provision.” This rather severe 
penalty provision is consistent with the fact that only the intent–based 
command and superior responsibility is included in Article 5.  
Yet, this severe penalty provision is contradictory to a line of 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals that regards the command 
responsibility as a sui generis offence for dereliction of duty, rather than a 
mode of liability in relation to the crimes of subordinates.90 If one follows 
this sui generis approach, the commander/superior is very likely to receive a 
more lenient sentence because the doctrine is viewed as a separate offence 
independent of or conceptually remote from the crimes committed by 
subordinates on the ground.91 In this understanding of the legal nature of the 
doctrine, the command responsibility is no longer a mode of liability in 
which one must take into account the nature and severity of the crimes in 
weighing the responsibility of the accused, but a separate criminal offence. 
Thus, the severe penalty provided in Article 5 signifies that the drafters of 
the Act were of the view that Article 5 command responsibility should be 
treated as a form of criminal participation in a commission of the crimes of 
subordinates, and consequently the gravity of the crime together with the 
degree of participation of the commander/superior should be taken into 
account in determining overall culpability. 
This wording on penalty in Article 5 of the Act would also remind 
Korean lawyers of the similar provision in Article 31 of the Korean Penal 
Code that states, “[a] person who instigate[s] . . . shall be punished with the 
same penalty as the perpetrator.”  In this context, Article 34(2) of the Code 
should also be noted as providing that, “a person who . . . aids or abets 
 90. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT–01–47–T, Judgment, ¶ 2076 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Hadžihasanović
Judgment], available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic_kubura/tjug/en/had-
judg060315e.pdf. The ruling in another ICTY case offers a compromise between the extreme 
of command responsibility being a “separate offence independent of the crime” and the 
opposite extreme where command responsibility is the “mode of liability for the crime.” See
Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT–01–48–T, Judgment, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/tjug/en/tcj051116e.pdf (“The imposition of 
responsibility upon a commander for breach of his duty is to be weighed against the crimes 
of his subordinates; a commander is responsible not as though he had committed the crime 
himself, but his responsibility is considered in proportion to the gravity of the offences 
committed.”). 
 91. Hadžihasanović Judgment, Case No. IT–01–47–T, 2076 (“The concept of 
command responsibility in this regard is exceptional in law in that it allows for a superior to 
be found guilty of a crime even if he had no part whatsoever in its commission (absence of 
an actus reus), and even if he never intended to commit the crime (absence of mens rea).  
Accordingly, the Chamber finds that the sui generis nature of command responsibility under 
Article 7(3) [command responsibility] of the Statute may justify the fact that the sentencing 
scale applied to those Accused convicted solely on the basis of Article 7(1) [individual 
responsibility] of the Statute, or cumulatively under Article 7(1) and 7(3), is not applied to 
those convicted solely under Article 7(3), in cases where nothing would allow that 
responsibility to be assimilated or linked to individual responsibility under Article 7(1).”).
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another person under his or her command and control [to commit a crime]   
. . . shall be punished with the same penalty as the perpetrator.”  
Considering these domestic criminal law provisions, we can say that the Act 
attaches a commander/superior under Article 5 a similar or the same 
culpability as a person who “instigates another person” or “aids or abets 
another person under his or her command and control” to commit a crime.
2. Article 15(1) and (2): “Failure to Prevent” as Substantive 
Offences 
Article 15 is provided under the heading of the “offences violating the 
duty of commanders and other superiors,” which suggests that Article 15 is 
not about modes of liability, but independent substantive offences. This is 
further supported by the location of Article 15 under Part 2 titled, 
“Punishment of the Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the ICC”, and between 
Article 14 (war crime) and Article 16 (offences against the administration of 
justice).  
The conduct criminalized by Article 15(1) and (2) is “omission,” more 
specifically “failure to prevent.” As analyzed above, this feature is also 
common to the Koreanized doctrine of command responsibility under 
Article 5 of the Act. Article 5, Article 15(1) and Article 15(2) are all talking 
about “failure to prevent.” 
It is obvious that Article 5 and Article 15(2) are different in that the 
“omission by negligence” in “failing to prevent” excluded from Article 5’s 
version of command responsibility is now provided in Article 15(2). What 
about Article 5 and Article 15(1)? Are they different from each other? In 
order to answer this question, we will consider three key features: i) the 
underlying conduct–type; ii) the relevant mental element; and iii) the 
essential nature of the omission.  
First, as just mentioned, both of Article 5 and Article 15(1) clearly 
provide that they are targeting the omission in terms of “failure to prevent” 
the crimes by subordinates. In this respect, there is no difference between 
Article 5 and Article 15(1).  
Second, as to mens rea, our analysis should start with Article 15(2), 
which states, “[a]ny person who commits the conduct provided in paragraph 
(1) by negligence.” This phrase is the typical way to provide “offences by 
negligence” in Korean criminal law. Although there is no mental element 
explicitly provided in Article 15(1), for Korean lawyers it is not difficult to 
deduce from this phrase in Article 15(2) that the hidden mental element in 
Article 15(1) is “intent” because an “offence by negligence” in Korean 
criminal law is a lex specialis vis-à-vis the underlying “offence by intent.”92 
  
 92. “Conduct performed without conceiving the requisite facts that constitute the 
elements of crimes due to negligence in paying ordinary attention shall be subject to 
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Furthermore, the penalty prescribed in Article 15(1), which is more severe 
than that of Article 15(2), also suggests that the mental element 
accompanying Article 15(1) is intent, be it dolus directus of the first degree 
or dolus eventualis.93 Thus, it seems safe for us to conclude that, whereas 
Article 15(2) provides “omission by negligence,” Article 15(1) prescribes 
“omission by intent.” In this respect, Article 5 and Article 15(1) are of the 
same legal nature (i.e., “omission by intent”). No difference again.  
Third and finally, with regard to the issue of “essential nature of 
omission,” we can find the relevant phrase “through his or her idleness or 
dereliction of duty” in Article 15(1). Although there is no equivalent 
wording in Article 5, this element should be regarded as being implicitly 
provided in Article 5 as well. That is because this phrase represents the 
fundamental nature of the concept of omission that forms the very grounds 
of culpability under Article 5. Accordingly, Article 5 and Article 15 share 
the same feature of “through his or her idleness or dereliction of duty.” No 
difference again. In conclusion, Article 5 and Article 15 share the same key 
legal features, and it is difficult to think of a reason for keeping them apart. 
The authors therefore recommend that Article 15(1) be deleted. We also 
advise that Article 15(2) be relocated under Article 5. As to Article 15(2), 
given the close relationship amounting to causation between the 
commander/superior’s “failure to prevent” and the crimes committed by 
subordinates, it is incorrect to view that Article 15(2) is a separate offence 
as currently provided. Article 15(2) should remain as a mode of liability and 
migrate to Article 5. 
3. Article 15(3): “Failure to Punish” as a Substantive Offence 
As briefly mentioned above, given the title of Article 15 (“offences
violating the duty of commanders and other superiors”), and its location in 
between Article 14 (war crimes) and Article 16 (offences against the 
administration of justice), it seems the drafters considered Article 15 a 
separate offence to be invoked as an independent criminal charge in the 
same way as other substantive offences under the classifications of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It is considered that, of 
the two limbs of the doctrine of command responsibility, (i.e., the “failure to 
prevent”–type and the “failure to punish”–type), this treatment as an 
independent criminal offence is appropriate only for the “failure to punish”–
type. That is because with regard to this type, there is a very remote 
relationship between the commander/superior’s omission and the crime 
punishment only if there is a special criminal provision to that effect.” Korean Penal Code, 
supra note 4, art. 14 (unofficial translation by the authors). 
 93. The Korean jurisprudence recognizes all three types of intent, i.e., “dolus 
directus of the first degree,” “dolus directus of the second degree,” and “dolus eventualis.”
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committed by his or her subordinates.94 Put differently, the absence of a 
causal relationship between the “omission to punish or report” 95 and the 
crime already committed by subordinates in the past appears to significantly 
undermine the validity of the wording “[a commander/superior] shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes . . . committed . . . as a result of [his or her 
omission to punish or report]” as provided in article 28(a) and (b) of the 
ICC Statute. It is not difficult to recognize causation or a possibility thereof 
between a commander/superior’s “omission to prevent” and the crimes 
committed by subordinates.96 As to the “omission to punish or report,”
however, it should not be the crime already committed by the subordinates 
for which the commander/superior is to be blamed and found culpable, but 
his or her own conduct (i.e., omission to punish or report). Thus, the crimes 
committed by subordinates cannot be the ontological source of the “failure 
to punish”–type responsibility. Imagine a situation where a commander took 
office after the crime had been committed.97 This type of command 
responsibility, therefore, cannot help but to find new legal grounds on which 
to stand “like an isolated tree alone on the battlefield,” other than the crimes 
already committed by subordinates.98 In this sense, Article 15(3) of the Act 
properly supplies what the “failure to punish”–type responsibility needs by 
classifying it as a separate and independent offence, and stipulates it as such 
in a separate provision. Although the requisite mens rea is not expressly 
provided in Article 15(3) (and accordingly it is difficult at the moment to 
precisely identify it), this separate stipulation away from Article 5 would 
also help distinguish the distinct nature of knowledge requirement for the 
 94. Stefan Trechsel, Command Responsibility as a Separate Offense, 3 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. PUBLICIST 26, 31–32 (2009). 
 95. Or, more precisely, omission to “take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power . . . to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation 
and prosecution.” See ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 28(a)(ii), 28(b)(iii). 
 96. In this respect, note that the jurisprudence of the ICTY, in general, does not 
require causation between the “omission to prevent” and the crimes committed by 
subordinates. In this connection, the Trial Chamber in Orić states, “[a]s concerns objective 
causality, however, it is well established case law of the Tribunal that it is not an element of 
superior criminal responsibility to prove that without the superior's failure to prevent, the 
crimes of his subordinates would not have been committed. This is so for good reasons.  
First, with regard to the superior's failure to punish, it would make no sense to require a 
causal link between an offence committed by a subordinate and the subsequent failure of a 
superior to punish the perpetrator of that same offence . . .” See Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. 
IT–03–68–T, Judgment, ¶ 338 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/ori-jud060630e.pdf. It seems at least 
this portion of reasoning quoted herein is not plausible because it is using a feature of the 
“failure to punish”–type in supporting a proposition on the “failure to prevent”–type. Given 
the wording of Article 28 ICC Statute that strongly indicates the causation (i.e., “as a result 
of”), it will be interesting to see the future development of the relevant jurisprudence at the 
ICC.
 97. Trechsel, supra note 94, at 26–27. 
 98. Id. at 31. 
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“failure to punish”–type from that of “failure to prevent”–type as explained 
by the Trial Chamber in Halilović:
The failure to punish and the failure to prevent are not only legally 
distinct, but are factually distinct in terms of the type of knowledge that is 
involved in each basis of superior responsibility. Failure to prevent 
presumes prior knowledge (“knew or had reason to know”) that crimes 
were being, or were about to be, committed, while failure to punish 
presumes subsequent knowledge (“knew or had reason to know”) that 
crimes had already been committed (emphasis added).99
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES IN KOREA
A. The Status of International Treaties in the Domestic Legal System 
of Korea 
Under the Korean legal system in particular, in terms of the hierarchy of 
the Constitution (highest level), acts (second highest level), and decrees or 
ordinances (third highest level), international treaties can be given one of 
the two statuses: as being either at the same level as “acts” that 
hierarchically rank immediately beneath the Constitution, or at the same 
level as “decrees or ordinances” that hierarchically rank immediately 
beneath the “acts.” Although some are of the view that the deciding factor 
here is whether there has been an involvement of the Korean National 
Assembly in the form of consent to ratification performed by the President 
of Korea,100 this view reflects only a part of the truth as will be explained 
below. 
Article 6(1) of the Korean Constitution provides, “[t]reaties duly 
concluded and promulgated under the Constitution . . . shall have the same 
 99. Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT–01–48–PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004), available at http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/tdec/en/041217.htm. This ruling is useful in clarifying the 
disjunctive nature of the two types of responsibilities under the doctrine of command and 
superior responsibility. See id. ¶ 33 (“The disjunctive nature of the bases of superior 
responsibility, combined with the distinguishing factor of the type of knowledge involved for 
each basis, means that an accused can be convicted on the basis of one omission even if the 
other is not proved. For example, if the Prosecution proves that the Accused knew that his 
subordinates had committed crimes in Uzdol, then if all the other elements of the crime are 
established, the Accused may be convicted based on his failure to punish those crimes, even 
if he had no prior knowledge and therefore lacked the ability to prevent their commission.  If, 
however, the Prosecution proves that the Accused knew that his subordinates were going to 
commit crimes in Uzdol, then if all the other elements of the crime are established, the 
Accused may be convicted based on his failure to prevent those crimes, even if he were no 
longer their superior after the crimes and therefore lacked the ability to punish their 
commission.”). 
 100. See infra note 101. 
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effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea.”101 As to the 
relationship between international treaties and domestic laws, Korea adopts 
the theory of monism102—i.e., the “theory of incorporation.” This theory 
means that international treaties have been regarded as forming part of 
Korea’s legal framework and have been given the force of law in that they 
do not require any process of legislative transformation thereof.103
International treaties, therefore, are incorporated into the domestic legal 
order of Korea without requiring a separate legislative action, and at the 
same time take effect as domestic law. Under the Korean constitutional 
structure, therefore, the procedure of consent to ratification governed by the 
National Assembly seems to be rather a part of its political control over the 
Executive’s act of concluding international treaties. In a monist country like 
Korea, the process of promulgation itself does not play the function of 
transforming a treaty into a domestic law as was the case in the states 
adopting the theory of dualism.104 The promulgation stage is just a part of 
national legislative procedure and has nothing to do with the procedure of 
forming international treaties at the international level.105
The Korean Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly 
stated that the term “domestic laws” in Article 6(1) of the Constitution 
indicates “acts” that are located at the second highest position just below the 
Constitution in the hierarchy of laws in Korea. The Korean Constitutional 
Court held with regard to the “Treaty Concerning Fishing Between Korea 
and Japan” that “domestically, this treaty, as a treaty duly concluded and 
promulgated under the Constitution, has the same effect as ‘acts.’”106 The 
Korean Supreme Court also granted the same effect as “acts” to “the 
 101. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 6(1) (S. Kor.) 
(“Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the generally 
recognized rules of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic laws of the 
Republic of Korea.”).
 102. For detailed analysis of the monism–dualism debate, see  Andrezej Wasilkowski, 
Monism and Dualism at Present, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRYSZTOE SKUBISZEWSKI, (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 
1996); Karl Josef Partsch, International Law and Municipal Law, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1183–1202 (1999). 
 103. See KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
RESERVATIONS AND THE THREE MODES OF LEGISLATION 241 (1967). 
 104. See CONSTANTIN ECONOMIDES, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC LAW 12–15 (1993) (discussing the standing of international treaties in domestic 
law). 
 105. The Promulgation is a formal act needed for a treaty to have legal force within 
Korea or to be incorporated into Korean law. However, the treaty is not transformed into 
Korean law. See YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW:
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW 25, n. 47 (1998). 
 106. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 99Hun–Ma139, at 142, 156, & 160, Mar. 21, 
2001 (S. Kor.); See also Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2000Hun–Ba20, Sept. 27, 2001 
(S. Kor.). 
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Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by Air.”107 On the other hand, 
as briefly alluded to above, the majority view amongst scholars and a 
decision of the Seoul High Court108 are of the opinion that only those 
treaties which the National Assembly’s consent to ratification is required as 
a part of its process to conclude are to be given the same status and effect as 
“acts.” They also argue that, so–called “executive agreements”—in other 
words the treaties concluded by the Executive without any involvement of 
the Legislature—have the status and effect at the same level as “decrees or 
ordinances” immediately beneath the level of “acts.” Article 60(1) of the 
Korean Constitution109 lists the treaties of important nature that require the 
National Assembly’s consent to ratification—a mandatory condition for 
their conclusion.110 There seems to be no dispute over the domestic status of 
the treaties that already went through the process of the Assembly’s consent 
to ratification—i.e., the status at the same level as “acts”—since it is the 
National Assembly that is in possession of the power to legislate “acts.” On 
the other hand, it seems problematic to sweepingly classify the treaties 
concluded without the Assembly’s consent as being equivalent to “decrees 
or ordinances” considering the fact that there are important treaties actually 
being concluded without the National Assembly’s involvement in Korea. 
That is because in Korea the decision about whether a treaty is of a nature to 
require the consent of the Assembly is at the Executive’s discretion, mainly 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
Given the jurisprudence of the Korean Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court, one might say that both Courts are taking a positive 
approach towards the domestic application of international law. For 
 107. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 82Da–Ka1372, July 27, 1986 (S. Kor.). The 
Court held that the Warsaw Convention has the domestic status of lex spcialis to the Korean 
Civil Code: “The Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol takes the same 
effect as domestic acts, and in terms of the legal issues concerning international carriage by 
air, it is lex specialis to the [Korean] Civil Code that is lex generalis.” Id.
 108. The Seoul High Court stated, on an extradition case, that a treaty that requires the 
National Assembly’s consent to ratification takes the same effect as “acts,” and that a treaty 
that does not require the consent takes the same effect as “decrees or ordinances.” See Seoul 
High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2006Do1, July 27, 2006 (S. Kor.). BOK–HYEON NAM,
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIALS 387 (2007). 
 109. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60(1) (“The National 
Assembly shall have the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties 
pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international 
organizations; treaties of friendship, trade, and navigation; treaties pertaining to any 
restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or people with 
an important financial obligation; and treaties related to legislative matters.”). 
110.  The wording of Article 60(1) of the Korean Constitution clearly suggests that the 
National Assembly’s right to consent should be confined to those listed in that Article. The 
purpose of Article 60(1) is to allow the National Assembly, by way of exception, to control 
the President’s right to conclude treaties. It seems therefore that the list in this Article should 
be regarded as exhaustive. Chin–Sok Chung, Legislative Consent to the Conclusion and 
Ratification of Treaties: Korean Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN KOREAN 
PERSPECTIVE 56 (Choong–Hyun Paik ed., 2004). 
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example, they are of the view that aggravated punishment on the basis of a 
treaty provision is possible in Korea. That is, the Korean Constitutional 
Court is of the view that, regarding the term “acts” in Article 13(1) of the 
Constitution that provides, “[n]o citizen shall be prosecuted for a conduct 
which does not constitute a crime under [a relevant] act in force at the time 
it was committed,” the Courts held that the term “act” includes international 
treaties concluded by Korea.111
Since the ICC Statute has been consented to by the National Assembly 
for ratification, it forms part of the Korean domestic legal order and has the 
force of law as “acts” in Korea. 
B. Direct Applicability of International Treaties in Korea 
For the discussion in this section, we need to distinguish the concept of 
“incorporation” and “application.” When Article 6(1) of the Korean 
Constitution states, “shall have the same effect as the domestic laws,” it 
talks about the “incorporation” of international treaties into national law. In 
this context, “incorporation” signifies only the possibility to be applied 
domestically. It does not, therefore, automatically mean that all the treaties 
are being executed and are directly applicable. In other words, the 
proposition that a specific treaty “has the same effect as the domestic laws”
does not necessarily mean that the treaty or its provision(s) create the rights 
and obligations directly invoked in domestic courts. In the middle of the 
concepts of “incorporation” and “application,” we can find a place for the 
“implementing legislation.” Whether a treaty is directly applicable without 
implementing legislation should be decided in view of the nature of the 
treaty itself and the provisions thereof.112  In this context, it should be noted 
that traditionally national jurisdictions have enjoyed broad discretion in 
determining how to incorporate and apply international law in their 
domestic legal order.113
The issue of direct applicability of international treaties is closely related 
to the question of whether a treaty is self–executing.114 The distinction 
between “self–executing treaty” and “non–self–executing treaty” has been 
developed from the case law of the United States,115 and such distinction has 
 111. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Hun–Ba65, Nov. 26, 1998 (S. Kor.). 
 112. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2000Hun–Ba20, Sept. 27, 2001 (S. Kor.) 
(“Since the relevant provision is pertaining to the issue of jurisdictional immunity, it is of the 
nature that is directly applicable in Korea.”) (emphasis added). 
 113. YAMAMOTO SHOJI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (Pae Keun Park trans., Korean 
Association of International Law of the Sea) (1999). 
 114. There are three concepts with respect to the application of international law in 
domestic legal systems. Terms like “direct application,” “domestic validity,” and “self–
executing” are used in different ways. WARD N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 6 (2006). 
 115. Albert Bleckman, Self–Executing Treaty Provisions, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 374 (2000). 
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not been adopted in Korea. Within the Korean legal system there are no 
criteria to classify international treaties on the basis of their distinct nature. 
The notion of “self–executing treaty” under American law means a treaty 
that is normatively concrete enough to be directly executed. On the 
contrary, “non–self–executing treaty” is understood as a treaty that creates 
only abstract rights and obligations to the parties. Thus, it is generally said 
that, for its actual implementation, the treaty requires new domestic 
legislation for that purpose. In short, the question of whether a treaty is of 
self–executing nature is only relevant to the concept of “execution,” but not 
directly to the issue of “incorporation.” The label “non–self–executing” has 
been attached to the treaties that require further implementing actions or that 
are not appropriate for immediate judicial enforcement.116
In Korea, if a treaty is of a “non–self–executing” nature and thereby 
lacks direct applicability, further steps to create concrete rights and 
obligations must be taken.117 Such steps include not only legislative actions 
but administrative and judicial measures. Yet in principle, in a monist 
country like Korea, even if a duly ratified and promulgated treaty is 
deficient in direct applicability, it is still in itself a valid domestic law and 
remains effective as a source of law. 
C. Necessity for Overcoming Incompatibility between the ICC 
Statute and Korean Law 
Although the ICC Statute has been incorporated into the Korean 
domestic legal order and has the same legal force as “acts,” there are 
provisions in the Statute which are difficult to directly execute in Korea.118
Korean criminal law, on the other hand, also has provisions incompatible 
with the ICC Statute. For some features of the ICC Statute, Korean criminal 
law lacks normative infrastructure for their direct application in Korea. For 
some others, there were discrepancies. Thus, in view of these difficulties, it 
was decided to enact an implementing legislation of the ICC Statute as a lex 
specialis to the Korean Penal Code.119
 116. Lori Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self–
Executing” and “Non–Self–Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 515, 516 (1991). 
 117. Recently, a growing number of international treaties in Korea accompany 
implementing legislation. Most of the treaties on economic and trade issues, such as the Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) or Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs), have been recently 
growing in numbers in Korea. These directly or indirectly require implementing legislation. 
 118. There are several ways to overcome these difficulties. First, domestic law should 
be amended before the Korean government enters into the treaty. Secondly, if there is no 
domestic law giving effect to the treaty, the Korean government usually attempts to enact 
laws to give effect to the treaty. Thirdly, even if a treaty is capable of regulating the matter 
directly, a special law is sometimes enacted, rephrasing the text of the treaty and adding 
some new provisions. See IWASAWA, supra note 105, at 27. 
 119. Some countries that consider themselves as having a domestic criminal law and 
the relevant proceedings to cover crimes under the ICC Statute only enact specific legislation 
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As a result, the Act has been prepared in which there are sections on, 
inter alia, the general principles of criminal law, definitions and elements of 
core international crimes, applicable penalties, and command and superior 
responsibility. Through this implementing legislation, Korean criminal law 
has set up a domestic penal system sufficient for prosecution and 
punishment of the core international crimes.  Furthermore, for the purpose 
of reinforcing the cooperation mechanism between Korea and the ICC—
though it employed a simple way to prescribe it—the legislation also 
contains provisions on cooperation including the issues of surrender and 
legal assistance.   
In terms of the definitions and elements of the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and their scope of penalties, Korean criminal law 
scholars felt an urgent need to have a set of domestic criminal law 
provisions thereof for the purpose of fully meeting the principle of legality, 
in spite of the international customary law origin of those crimes. This 
approach was also supported to facilitate the future domestic criminal 
proceedings pursuant to the principle of complementarity as enshrined in 
Articles 1 and 17 as well as paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the ICC 
Statute.120 In addition to the core international crimes, the implementing 
legislation provides the elements and penalties of “the offences against the 
administration of justice” of the ICC reflecting Article 70 of the ICC 
Statute. Though the legislation does not provide the basis for jurisdiction 
with regard to these offences, it seems these offences apply when 
committed in Korea or by Korean nationals outside Korea.
The Act also introduced some features of general principles under Part 3 
of the ICC Statute that have not been provided in the Korean Penal Code, 
including universal jurisdiction,121 non–exclusion of criminal responsibility 
for conduct pursuant to superior orders,122 command and superior 
responsibility,123 and non–applicability of statute of limitations.124  
Conversely, the feature of conditional prosecution or punishment under the 
  
on the cooperation and judicial assistance issues. Japan would be an example. Japan enacted 
a domestic implementation act on cooperation with the ICC on April 27, 2007. 
 120. For details of this principle, see FLORIAN RAZESBERGER, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY (2006); JO STIGEN, RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE 
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY (2008); COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AMSTERDAM, 25–26 JUNE 2004 (Jann K. Kleffner & 
Gerben Kor, eds., 2006). 
 121. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(5). 
 122. Id. art. 4. 
 123. Id. art. 5. 
 124. Id. art. 6. 
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Korean Penal Code concerning some crimes has been excluded for the 
crimes provided in the Act.125
III. BASIS FOR CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
A. Incorporation of a Traditional Basis for Criminal Jurisdiction 
As mentioned above, the ICC Statute adopts the principle of 
complementarity and proclaims that its jurisdiction is complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions. For the execution of its primary jurisdiction 
on the core international crimes, Article 3 of the Act articulates the scope of 
the Act’s criminal jurisdiction providing the jurisdictional basis traditionally 
recognized under international law. Except for Article 3(5) which reflects 
the theory of universal jurisdiction, the normative origin of every other 
jurisdictional basis provided in Article 3 stems from the jurisdictional 
framework of the Korean Penal Code.126 The traditional basis for criminal 
jurisdiction all require a nexus between the exercise of “power to enforce 
law” and “the protection of its people or territory.”127 In this respect, Article 
3(1) of the Act provides for the principle of territoriality that is the basic 
jurisdictional base to regulate any crimes committed within the Korean 
territory, regardless of the nationality of a perpetrator or victim.128 Second, 
as an extension of the territoriality principle, the Act is also applicable to a 
foreigner who commits a crime under the Act in a vessel or aircraft of the 
Republic of Korea outside the territory thereof.129 Third, the Act also adopts 
the principle of active personality in Article 3(2). Under this principle, any 
Korean national who commits a crime provided in the Act outside the 
territory of Korea is subject to punishment.130 Of course, actual execution of 
criminal jurisdiction under the Act in this case would only be possible when 
the perpetrator is present in Korea. Fourth, the Act prescribes the principle 
of the passive personality that allows the prosecution of a foreigner who 
 125. Id. art. 17. For example, in relation to the crime of rape, the prosecutors cannot 
indict a suspect without complaint or motion from the victim or other persons entitled by 
law; as regards the offence of assault, whilst the prosecutors has discretionary power to indict 
a suspect, the suspect is not subject to punishment if the victim expresses that punishment is 
against his or her will.   
 126. Korean Penal Code, supra note 4, arts. 2–6. 
 127. Ann–Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National 
Courts, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS 
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 168, 171–72 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2006). 
 128. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(1) (“This Act shall apply to any Korean national or 
foreigner who commits a crime under this Act within the territory of the Republic of 
Korea.”) (corresponding to the Korean Penal Code, supra note 4, art. 2). 
 129. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(3) (corresponding to the Korean Penal Code, supra note 
4, art. 4). 
 130. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(2) (corresponding to the Korean Penal Code, supra note 
4, art. 3). 
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commits a crime under the Act against the Republic of Korea or any of its 
people outside the territory of Korea.131 The Act, however, does not 
introduce the protective principle, probably because it is hard to imagine a 
situation where a crime under the Act committed outside the territory of 
Korea infringes on vital political or economic interests or the national 
security of Korea.132  Even when such situations happen, the execution of 
universal jurisdiction explained below will cover the lacuna of the 
protective principle. 
B. Article 3(5): Reception of Universal Jurisdiction 
Though the Korean Penal Code has not had a provision on universal 
jurisdiction, the Act accepts the idea by providing, “this Act shall apply to 
any foreigner who commits a crime such as genocide [etc.] outside the 
territory of the Republic of Korea and stays in the territory thereof.”133  That 
is, Korea has introduced and explicitly prescribed for the first time in its 
history the principle of universal jurisdiction for the purpose of strict 
adherence to the principle of legality.134
Universal jurisdiction is usually exercised without any traditional nexus 
either to nationality or territory. This jurisdictional base, therefore, allows a 
state to prosecute any perpetrator regardless of his or her nationality or the 
place where the crime was committed, which is called “absolute universal 
jurisdiction.”135 Yet, exercising absolute universal jurisdiction is likely to 
cause a risk of unjustifiable intervention into another state’s internal affairs, 
and as a consequence, a reason for diplomatic frictions. To avoid this 
undesirable situation, many countries impose some restrictions on the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. In this respect, the most commonly used 
method is to actually require the traditional link to nationality or territory,136
 131. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(4) (corresponding to the Korean Penal Code, supra note 
4, art. 6). 
 132. The implementing legislation of Canada also does not provide the protective 
principle. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, §§ 6, 8 
(Can.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/C/C-45.9.pdf. 
 133. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(5). 
 134. Theoretically speaking, since customary international law is to be incorporated 
into the Korean legal order and to have the same legal force as domestic laws, the Korean 
courts can exercise universal jurisdiction that has been recognized under customary 
international law directly without any national legislation. In spite of this theoretical 
possibility, however, clear prescription of the jurisdictional base for exercising universal 
jurisdiction in domestic legislation would be in stricter conformity with the principle of 
legality. For this reason, the Princeton Principle also emphasizes the need for adoption of 
national legislation of universal jurisdiction.  See Slaughter, supra note 127, at 24. 
 135. Payam Akhavan, Whither National Courts? The Rome Statute’s Missing Half?, 8
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1245, 1252 (2010). 
 136. Reydams argues that it would be erosion to the very concept of “jurisdiction” if a 
state exercises jurisdiction over a case in respect of which the state lacks any objective or 
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which is referred to as “conditional universal jurisdiction.”137 On the basis 
of this theory, the Act requires a territorial nexus in that Korea can exercise 
the universal jurisdiction only where a suspect of foreign nationality who 
committed a crime outside the territory of Korea is present in its territory.138
The ICC Statute does not include any provision that enforces State 
Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction. One might think that Article 3(5) 
of the Act adopting universal jurisdiction is based on a treaty given that i) 
the Preamble of the ICC Statute connotes universal jurisdiction139 and ii) 
many countries’ implementing legislations accept the idea. It is considered, 
however, that Article 3(5) should be regarded as an extension of customary 
international law from which the idea of universal jurisdiction under the 
customary international law reflected in the ICC Statute and national 
implementing legislations thereof originated. 
C. Article 3(5): Meaning of the “Presence” Requirement 
 The requirement to be subsequently present in the territory of Korea 
under the Act’s Article 3(5) does not mean that the person must have an 
address or residence in Korea. This “presence” requirement is also relevant 
to the “enforcement jurisdiction” (compétence d’exécution or jurisdiction to 
enforce rules) because, if the jurisdiction under Article 3(5) is constituted, 
investigative agencies also initiate their investigation over the suspect. The 
“presence” requirement also eases the investigative burden of law 
enforcement agencies in Korea. On the other hand, a commentator 
envisages a situation where, due to the “presence” requirement, all the 
proceedings against a suspect should halt when a suspect escapes across the 
Korean border upon the initiation of an investigation.140 He would further 
opine that, in this case, extradition requests might not be feasible. Yet, it is 
doubtful whether this kind of strict interpretation of the “presence”
requirement serves the purpose of the Act to implement the ICC Statute.  
It is true that in some cases domestic law enforcement agencies might be 
reluctant to investigate or prosecute as the crimes provided in the Act are 
likely to be of a political nature. In this context, the “presence” requirement 
might be abused by the agencies—for example, after receiving 
communication the agencies can just wait until the suspect leaves the 
legal link to the perpetrator or the offence. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 224 (2003). 
 137. Many legal systems do not permit trials in absentia; the presence of the accused 
on the territory is then a condition for the exercise of jurisdiction. See Akhavan, supra note 
135, at 1252. 
 138.  See Reydams, supra note 136, at 224.
 139. ICC Statute, supra note 2, pmbl., ¶¶ 3, 4, 6. 
 140. IN–KYU LIM, SENIOR ADVISOR, JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE NAT’L ASSEMBLY,
REPORT ON THE ACT ON THE PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 23 (2007). 
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country.141 Thus, an overly strict interpretation of this requirement might 
significantly undermine the applicability of Article 3(5) of the Act.  
Conversely, such interpretation can also excessively restrict the 
investigative power of the law enforcement agencies when they are willing 
to investigate and prosecute. The authors are of the view that the “presence”
requirement should be regarded as only being relevant to the timing of 
initiation of investigation. Accordingly, the investigation can continue even 
when the suspect escapes across the border.142 If enough evidence is 
collected, extradition requests should also be permitted. 
In addition, universal jurisdiction under Article 3(5) of the Act needs to 
be exercised supplementary to the jurisdiction of the suspect or victim’s
nationality and that of the state in which the relevant crime was 
committed.143 In this way, Korea might avoid unnecessary friction over the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
IV. COOPERATION WITH THE ICC 
A. Adoption of the Scheme of Mutatis Mutandis Application 
Article 86 of the ICC Statute provides the general cooperation obligation 
of State Parties, and Article 88 imposes an obligation on the State Parties to 
“ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of 
the forms of cooperation which are specified under” Part 9 of the ICC 
Statute. Accordingly, the Act contains a section on international cooperation 
and legal assistance. In this respect, the Act took an approach to include the 
relevant provisions within a single Act instead of preparing a separate Act 
on the cooperation issues, as is the case with a number of other countries. 
In the process of drafting the Act, drafters initially stipulated detailed 
provisions on the important aspects of Part 9 of the ICC Statute, including 
those under Part 10 thereof concerning enforcement. At the review stage, 
however, given that existing domestic law covers most of the features under 
Parts 9 and 10, the drafters decided to apply mutatis mutandis—the two 
pre–existing legislations of the “Extradition Act” and the “International 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.” In case of a discrepancy 
between either of these two Acts and the ICC Statute, Articles 19(1) and 
 141. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE 
ART (2006) 67–68, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf. 
 142. This kind of universal jurisdiction permits Korean national authorities to 
commence criminal investigations when Korean authorities are seized with information 
concerning an alleged criminal offence. Korean prosecution services may exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over the offence without requiring that the alleged offender first be present, even 
temporarily, in Korean territory. See Akhavan, supra note 135, at 1252. 
 143. Slaughter, supra note 127, at 23; Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for 
Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
589, 593–95 (2003). 
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20(1) of the Act grant primacy to the provisions of the ICC Statute. 
Furthermore, as explained above, since the ICC Statute has already been 
incorporated into the Korean national legal order, the provisions under Part 
9 are considered to be directly applicable in Korea. Taking into account this 
legal mechanism, the authors think that most features of Part 9 of the ICC 
Statute are to be executed in Korea on the caveat that there is still some 
room for challenges on the basis of legal uncertainty originating from the 
inherent nature of the mutatis mutandis application scheme. 
B. Mutatis Mutandis Application of the Extradition Act 
Article 19(1) of the Act provides that, concerning surrender of a person 
to the ICC, the Extradition Act of Korea shall be applied mutatis mutandis
with the proviso that, in a case where a provision in the ICC Statute 
provides differently than that of the “Extradition Act” the former prevails. 
For this mutatis mutandis application, Article 19(2) replaces the term “the 
requesting state” in the “Extradition Act” with the ICC, and “the extradition 
treaty” with the ICC Statute. Through this legislative method, most of the 
obligations related to “surrender to the ICC” can be performed.  
Yet, as prescribed in Article 102 of the ICC Statute, the concept of 
“surrender” has a different definition than that of “extradition.”144
Moreover, the object of the application of the “rule of speciality” as 
provided in Article 101 of the ICC Statute is not a “crime” but a “conduct”
or a “course of conduct,” which is not the case with “extradition.” Other 
features only applicable to “surrender to the ICC” are: i) exclusion of the 
traditional grounds to decline extradition requests such as the “political 
offence exception” and the “practice of non–extradition of nationals”; ii) 
non–applicability of the “double criminality” clause; and iii) non–
applicability of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, when the 
“Extradition Act” is actually applied mutatis mutandis, these aspects 
peculiar to “surrender to the ICC” should be borne in mind so as not to 
hamper the compliance with the relevant cooperation requests from the ICC.  
Particularly, matters related to the “political offence exception” and the 
“practice of non–extradition of nationals” are likely to cause difficulties as 
they are not explicitly provided for in the ICC Statute. Namely, since there 
is no relevant provision in the ICC Statute, there is no room for the clause 
stipulating the primacy of the provisions of the ICC Statute over those of the 
“Extradition Act” as provided in Article 19(1) to be applied. As a 
consequence, the “political offence exception” and the “practice of non–
 144. ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 102(a)–(b) (“For the purposes of this Statute: 
‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this 
Statute. ‘[E]xtradition’ means the delivering up of a person by one State to another as 
provided by treaty, convention or national legislation.”). 
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extradition of nationals,” as provided in the “Extradition Act,” might prevail 
over “surrender to the ICC.”
At this point, we might explore further these two aspects in the context 
of the “Extradition Act” of Korea. The “practice of non–extradition of 
nationals” is provided in Article 9(1) of the “Extradition Act.” However, it 
should be noted that it is not an absolute prohibition on the extradition of 
Korean nationals, as the provision employs the wording of “may not
transfer.” In a case involving Korean nationals, therefore, the “Extradition 
Act” proclaims that the Korean government has discretion over whether it 
will surrender the person to the ICC, which is contradictory to the 
mandatory compliance regime as provided in Article 89(1) of the ICC 
Statute. On the contrary, the “political offence exception,” as prescribed in 
Article 8(1) of the “Extradition Act,” states that the Korean government 
“shall not transfer” when “the offence is of a political nature” or “the 
offence is related to an offence of a political nature.” The wordings 
employed here seem to allow quite a broad scope of application of this 
provision, encompassing related offences that are not of a political nature 
per se. Consequently, everything seems to be dependent on the Korean 
government’s interpretation of “the political nature of an offence” or of 
“whether an offence is related to an offence of a political nature.” In this 
context, Articles 8(1)2 and 8(1)3 of the “Extradition Act” must be noted as 
a proviso to the “political offence exception.” Article 8(1)2 states that, if an 
extradition request is relevant to a political offence in respect of which a 
multi–lateral treaty obliges Korea to prosecute or to extradite a suspect (aut 
dedere aut judicare), Korea may transfer the suspect. It seems this provision 
might provide legitimate grounds for Korea to surrender a suspect to the 
ICC even when the relevant offence is of a political nature as the ICC 
Statute is a “multi–lateral treaty” that obligates Korea to surrender a person 
pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Statute. Moreover, another provision—
Article 8(1)3—appears to grant additional legal grounds to Korea to 
surrender a person to the ICC when it provides that, if the relevant offence 
violates, threatens, or risks life or body of many people, the Korean 
government, again may transfer the person. Given that the crimes under the 
ICC Statute generally involve many victims, Article 8(1)3 of the 
“Extradition Act” can also be invoked for the purpose of surrendering a 
person who allegedly committed a political crime. It is considered that this 
“political offence exception” should be addressed seriously as all the crimes 
provided in the ICC Statute are— to a varying extent—of a political nature. 
In short, as examined thus far, although there is a normative possibility 
embedded in the Extradition Act for “surrender to the ICC” despite the 
“political offence exception” and the “practice of non–extradition of 
nationals,” it still remains as a discretionary mechanism heavily dependent 
on the relevant interpretation and decision of the Korean government. In 
order to eliminate this normative uncertainty, it is recommended to 
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introduce a mandatory scheme vis-à-vis the cooperation requests from the 
ICC concerning offences of political nature and Korean nationals. 
With regard to the mutatis mutandis application of the “Extradition Act,”
another important aspect draws our attention—matters regarding Article 
98(1) of the ICC Statute. This provision entitles a State to refuse a request 
for surrender or assistance from the ICC on the basis of “State immunity” or 
“diplomatic immunity.” In this respect, some are of the opinion that these 
kinds of immunity under international law are only applicable to officials of 
non–State Parties to the ICC Statute.145 In other words, the head of State, 
high ranking officials, and diplomats of State Parties are not entitled to 
enjoy immunities under Article 98(1). It is noteworthy that some State 
Parties have incorporated this idea in their implementing legislations of the 
ICC Statute. For instance, the International Criminal Court Act 2001 of the 
United Kingdom provides that “any State or diplomatic immunity attaching 
to a person by reason of a connection with a state party to the ICC Statute, 
does not prevent” the arrest in the U.K. and surrender to the ICC.146 It 
demonstrates a legal interpretation of the interaction between Article 27 and 
Article 98(1) through which Article 98(1) is viewed as permitting a State 
Party to arrest and surrender—in its own territory upon the request from the 
ICC—an official of another State Party. 
There are varying views as to the question of with whom the power to 
decide the applicability of State immunity or diplomatic immunity under 
Article 98(1) of the ICC Statute should be vested. In this regard, while the 
implementing legislations of Canada and New Zealand give this authority to 
the ICC, those of Australia and Switzerland keep this power domestically 
(in Australia, the Attorney–General decides; in Switzerland, it is the Federal 
Council).147 It appears that these decisions bind domestic courts. 
Although the issue of granting immunity under Article 98(1) has rarely 
been addressed by implementing legislations of the ICC Statute, it would be 
appropriate for the Act to add relevant provisions dealing with the question 
of whether immunity under Article 98(1) is allowed in connection with 
Article 27, and—if yes—who should be vested with the power to decide on 
 145. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal 
Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 422 (2004). 
 146. International Criminal Court Act 2001, c. 17, § 23(1) (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 2001/17/contents. See also International Crimes and 
International Criminal Court Act 2000, § 31(1), (N.Z.), available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act /public/2000/0026/latest/DLM63091.html. 
 147. International Criminal Court Act 2002 s. 2 (Austl.); FF 2000 (Swiss Federal Law 
of 22 June 2001, on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court), 2748 arts. 4(d), 6(1), 
translated in EUR. CONSULT. ASS., THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER 
STATES OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE OF                                         
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2001), 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_hrlcicju/Switzerland/Federal_Law_on_Co-
Operation_with_the_International_Criminal_Court.pdf. 
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the matter. This clarification would help prevent diplomatic frictions on the 
issue of immunity. 
C. Mutatis Mutandis Application of the International Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
Article 20(1) of the Act provides that, on the issues of mutual legal 
assistance between the ICC and Korea, the “International Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act” (“Legal Assistance Act”) shall be 
applied mutatis mutandis with the proviso that, in a case where a provision 
in the ICC Statute provides differently than that of the “Legal Assistance 
Act,” the former prevails. For this mutatis mutandis application, Article 
20(2) replaces the term “foreign state” in the “Legal Assistance Act” with 
“the ICC,” and “the assistance treaty” with “the ICC Statute.”
Regarding the mutual legal assistance, there are discrepancies between 
Korean domestic law and the ICC Statute. Article 93(4) of the ICC Statute 
specifies that a State Party is entitled to decline a request for assistance from 
the ICC only if the request concerns the production of documents or 
disclosure of evidence which relates to the State’s national security. Article 
6 of the Legal Assistance Act, however, lists additional grounds to refuse 
assistance requests in addition to “national security.” The same situation—
as explained above in relation to the “Extradition Act” —also happens here.  
That is, since the list in Article 6 contains items that are not provided in the 
ICC Statute, the clause providing the primacy of the ICC Statute over the 
“Legal Assistance Act” on the matters of discrepancy (prescribed in Article 
20(1) of the Act) is not applicable. It is therefore possible that Korea may 
still refuse to provide assistance to the ICC on the basis of Article 6 of the 
“Legal Assistance Act.” It is recommended that this aspect be clarified 
through revision of the Act. 
D. Absence of Provisions on Other Cooperation 
For the purpose of close cooperation, it is considered that a specific 
governmental agency in charge of communications with the ICC and 
execution of cooperation requests needs to be designated. This arrangement 
would also prevent confusion and friction among the Korean governmental 
bodies.  
In addition, taking into account implementing legislation of South Africa 
that allows the ICC to sit in its territory, subject to specified procedures,148
the Act might include a provision permitting the ICC to hold trials in Korea 
if need be. Although this arrangement is not a necessary matter to be 
 148. Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 
of 2002 ch. 1(3)(e)(iii) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a27-
02.pdf.  
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provided in the Act, it would help enable the ICC to have normative 
grounds to sit in the territory of Korea.  
In terms of cooperation with the ICC, it is regrettable to see that the Act 
adopted a legislative method that is too concise to ensure the comprehensive 
cooperation between ICC and Korea. Faced with this reality, it is strongly 
suggested that, where there is discrepancy between the ICC Statute and 
domestic law, Korea perform the obligations as a State Party in a way that is 
consistent with the object and purpose of the ICC Statute. 
CONCLUSION
The egregious crimes under the ICC Statute are not at all new to the 
Korean people. The history of Korea in the Twentieth Century is dotted 
with heinous events under Japanese colonization and the Korean War. In 
that sense, Korea shares—to a significant extent—the unfortunate 
experiences of mankind in this Century. Even today, there are concentration 
camps in North Korea where serious violations of human rights are 
allegedly being committed on a daily basis. In this connection, we now 
witness a large–scale civil movement in South Korea aimed at bringing 
senior members of the North Korean Regime before the ICC. Nobody can 
anticipate to what extent the Korean courts will encounter actual cases to 
which the Act is applicable. Depending on the political development 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula, it might also be the case that the 
provisions in the Act are to be invoked by many Korean lawyers in the 
courtroom. Now, the rules have been laid out. 

